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Abstract 
This thesis asks how developments in The Swedish Social Democratic Party’s 
welfare ideology over the past 70 years can be understood, using the conceptual 
lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals. To answer 
this question, the thesis models a tailor-made seminal analytical tool; a code 
scheme of numerous operational indicators for Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social 
Investment welfare ideals. The tool conceptualizes the three welfare ideals as 
utterly distinct, and hence serve as a foundation for an ideal type analysis of The 
Swedish Social Democratic Party’s advocated welfare ideal.  The tool is applied 
to 21 election manifestos, published by The Swedish Social Democratic Party 
between 1948 and 2014. Through a numerical content analysis, the thesis 
identifies operational indicators for each welfare ideal, and examines short- and 
long-run developments of the party’s expressed desires for the structure of the 
welfare system. In sum, the thesis concludes that the Keynesian ideal has been, 
and continues to be, most important for The Swedish Social Democratic Party. 
Yet, from 1948 to 1976/1979 this ideal was contested by the Social Investment 
ideal. From 1976/1979, the Neoliberal ideal has instead contested the Keynesian. 
Since the breakpoint, the Social Investment ideal has steadily increased its 
influence.  
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1 Introduction 
‘Next year, a whole new kind of election campaign awaits.’ 
 
    (My translation, DNa, 2017) 
 
The second Sunday of September in 2018, it is once again time for the Swedish 
population to visit their polling stations and vote for the next mandate’s 
constellation of political parties in government and in opposition (Swedish 
Election Authority, 2017). One can wonder if the former Swedish social 
democratic prime minister Per Albin Hansson – the ancestor of the Swedish 
welfare state – would recognize the welfare ideology of his party today 
(Nationalencyklopedin a)? The national election is one among many in Swedish 
history, yet this occasion seems to symbolize something more than merely a 
(possible) change in the country’s political power constellation. Instead, national 
media portrays the upcoming election as a ‘bloodbath’ [my translation] (Mellin, 
2017). The Swedish population is fed with dramatic statements about political 
parties in crisis. Supposedly, ‘[i]mmense [ideological] uncertainty will 
characterize the election campaign’ [my translation], caused by substantial 
changes in power dynamics of the party system (DNb, 2017). Furthermore, 
Sweden has a ‘completely new [political] agenda’ [my translation] (DNa, 2017). 
Focus is now directed towards how the established Swedish welfare system 
should attend to the modern issues of immigration and integration (DNa, 2017). 
The cry of change is inescapable for the electorate.  
The matter is not only brought to the fore by national news channels. 
Scientific scholars have also directed attention towards the issue1. For example, 
the Swedish political scientists Maria Oskarson and Marie Demker provide 
important suggestions for the Swedish case. They propose that the importance of 
the dichotomous left- and right-wing politics is decreasing and that this has caused 
change in the Swedish party system (Demker, 2015, p. 270; Oskarson & Demker, 
2015, p. 629). Recent developments involve two important tipping points. Firstly, 
The Moderate Party, The Liberal Party, The Center Party and the Christian 
Democrats acting as one united body in the run-up for the national election in 
2006, meant that the right-wing policy priorities, in general, moved towards the 
middle. To cope, The Swedish Social Democratic Party (the major actor to the 
left) also had to move towards the ideological middle. The major political forces 
converged and the right- and left-wing divide has since then become less 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 This body of literature goes beyond the Swedish boarders and encompasses a multitude of explanations to the 
features of contemporary European politics (Giddens, 1998, p. 37-38, 43; Moschonas, 2002, p. 318). 
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prominent. The decline in prominence of dichotomous right- and left-wing 
politics has allowed other cleavages to become more important when competing 
over the electorate’s votes. Secondly, the strong bond between the party which has 
dominated the parliamentary arena during the last century and its unconditional 
support group, has been (gradually) dissolved. The Swedish Social Democratic 
Party (SAP2) no longer has monopoly on the labor workers’ votes (Demker, 2015, 
p. 270; Oskarson & Demker, 2015, p. 629).  
Oskarson and Demker consider these two occurrences as cardinal to recent 
peculiarities in Swedish party politics. Importantly, the authors argue that the 
actions of The Swedish Social Democratic Party have allowed a firm 
establishment of the ‘radical’ Sweden Democrats (Oskarson & Demker, 2015, p. 
629).  Due to recent trends, The Sweden Democrats can both compete over the 
electorate’s votes on issues other than the traditional right- and left divide and 
persuade the (no longer SAP loyal) working-class voters (Oskarson & Demker, 
2015, p. 629-631).  
The actions of SAP are thus pinpointed as crucial to the perception of a 
political system in chaos, currently faced by the electorate. Yet, many questions 
about the details of this crucial behavior remains unanswered. Has the spread of 
neoliberal ideas about the efficiency of the market and individual above collective 
responsibility infiltrated the SAP? Has SAP dismissed extensive responsibility for 
the labor worker in favor of enhanced labor market flexibility?  
To navigate in the political landscape and make well-grounded decisions – 
both in September 2018 and in further political decision-making – society at large 
needs comprehensive answers to such questions. This thesis provides important 
contributions to this kind of understandings by examining SAP’s political supply 
in detail. It addresses key questions, like the ones posed above, by conducting a 
systematic temporal analysis of SAP’s welfare ideology. The analysis 
encompasses three contrasting views on how to structure the welfare system. It 
considers SAP’s relation to (1) Keynesian state- and equality-centric ideals, (2) 
Neoliberal market- and autonomy-centric ideals, and (3) Social Investment future- 
and multipurpose-centric ideals. The analysis covers SAP’s political supply from 
the end of the Second World War until present day. The contrasting views on how 
to structure the welfare system are considerably comprehensive. The thesis is thus 
shaped to study both SAP’s positioning along the right- and left-wing divide and 
the party’s appeal to the electorate.  
In sum, this thesis both enables the Swedish citizen to gain better 
understanding of the party system’s conditions and provides further analysis and 
substance to the academic debate.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 The Swedish Social Democratic Party is in Swedish called Socialdemokraterna. The party is henceforth 
referred to as SAP (the common abbreviation of Socialdemokraterna).  
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1.1 Research problem 
Political systems could be studied from an almost infinite number of perspectives. 
Yet, this thesis focuses exclusively on developments of the welfare ideology 
advocated by the SAP. To convince the reader of the suitability of this focus, this 
passage serves to answer three core questions; (1) why study welfare state ideals, 
(2) why study social democracy, and (3) why study The Swedish Social 
Democratic Party? Jointly, answering these questions means accounting for the 
research problem of this thesis. How has the initially hegemonic and politically 
rigid SAP adjusted its core concern – the structure of the welfare state – to survive 
in a modern environment tinged by intensified competition and change in rules of 
the political game? That is the puzzle! 
Studying welfare state ideals is important as the logic of such morals are 
constantly present in everyday politics. Supposedly, the welfare state has served 
as western democracies’ ‘major peace formula’ in the aftermath of the Second 
World War (Offe, 2006, p. 66). Nevertheless, modern globalization – regarded as 
intensified intergovernmental interaction –  reveals cross border discrepancies in 
views of how to organize and attend to needs of the (inter)national population 
(Scholte, 2005, p. 49-50, 54-56, 64-67, 84). The welfare structure is thus no 
longer only an internal matter – within country boarders – but approaching the 
status of an international issue, with implications crossing national frontiers (Wall, 
2012).  
According to the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen, the welfare 
structure of such capitalist democracies can be divided into three distinct 
categories; liberal, conservative (or corporatist), and social democratic welfare 
state regimes3. Social democratic welfare state regimes represent the smallest 
cluster (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 111-112). This regime type differs from the 
two others in a number of ways, two of which are especially important for this 
thesis. First, the structure of social democratic welfare state regimes was 
prominently set by a distinct party family – namely the Social Democratic Parties. 
The linkage between the liberal and conservative types, and specific political 
parties is considerably less close. Second, social services of social democratic 
welfare state regimes encompass a comparatively wider part of the population. In 
the liberal and conservative regime types, the welfare state is designed to satisfy 
minimum level needs (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 112). By contrast, in social 
democratic regimes, the welfare state ‘promote an equality of the highest 
standards’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 112). In sum, studying social democracy is 
thus an important component to understand structures of more rare welfare 
systems.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 A detailed explanation of these categories falls outside the scope of this thesis. However, for an exhaustive 
analysis, the interested reader should consult Esping-Andersen’s (1990) The three worlds of welfare capitalism, 
Cambridge: Polity.  
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Not only does Sweden embody a prime example of Esping-Andersen’s social 
democratic welfare state regime, but the Swedish SAP also represents a unique 
case among other social democratic parties (Arts & Gelissen, 2006, p. 186; 
Esping-Andersen, 2006a, p. 167, 169; Therborn, 1994, p. 59). During the last 
century, SAP has accounted for an incomparable parliamentary power (Esping-
Andersen, 1994, p. 77; Therborn, 1994, p. 59,61). Esping-Andersen writes about 
SAP’s dominance as a ‘hegemony’ [my translation] (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 
77). Yet, the author advocates caution in equalizing the Swedish welfare state to 
SAP (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 75). Instead, the development of Swedish 
welfare has been characterized by substantial political agreement – wide across 
the political spectra (Thullberg & Östberg, 1994, p. 5).  
Furthermore, as any other (non-authoritarian) political actor, SAP has had to 
balance internal ideals and external pressure (such as political collaborations, 
swing in electoral opinion etc.). This holds for SAP’s welfare ideal too (Esping-
Andersen, 1994, p. 77). To avoid a naive perception of SAP as an unprecedented 
creator of an ideologically uniform welfare state, it is therefore important to 
examine internal developments of SAP’s welfare state ideals. Concisely, this 
thesis is required as it elaborates on the (partly misleading) conception of SAP as 
the sole progenitor of a sturdy Swedish welfare pathos.  
Finally, as explained in the introduction, studying SAP’s political supply is 
important not only to the academia but to (the Swedish) society at large. This, as 
the behavior of the party affects the general structure of the party system and thus 
everyday political experiences of the population (Oskarson & Demker, 2015, p. 
629-631, 646).  
1.2 Disposition 
This section explains the outline of the rest of the thesis. The thesis begins by 
presenting previous research related to the research problem. The section on 
previous research provides the thesis with information of how the research 
problem has been solved before, as well as identifies gaps in preexisting 
knowledge. Further, the passage on previous research serves as a foundation for 
this thesis’s later discussion on its results.  
The purpose of this thesis is then presented, involving the specified research 
question:  How can developments in SAP’s welfare ideology over the past 70 
years be understood, using the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and 
Social Investment welfare ideals? This section also explicitly states the identified 
gaps in preexisting research, as well as accounts for the thesis’s scientific and 
popular relevance.  Importantly, the section moreover describes the content 
delimitations and the notion definitions involved in this thesis.  
Next, this thesis’s theoretical framework is presented. The theoretical 
framework consists of two important parts. The first part involves a temporal 
benchmark, to which the results of this thesis are later compared. This temporal 
dimension is important as it allows a comparison between SAP specific responses 
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to socioeconomic and cultural changes, and the general traits of such adjustments. 
The second part encompasses three conceptual lenses, each accounting for a 
distinct view on welfare ideals. Finally, the section describes how the general 
theoretical implications have been modeled into a tailor-made analytical tool.   
After presenting the theoretical framework, this thesis discusses the choice of 
research material and method. The method’s presentation explains in detail how 
characteristics of the three conceptual lenses were sought in the material (by using 
a numerical content analysis). Subsequently, the thesis presents and discusses the 
results generated herein. The findings are discussed in relation to suggestions of 
previous scholars and in relation to the temporal benchmark presented in the 
section on theoretical framework.  
Ultimately, the thesis concludes by answering the initially postulated research 
question. In sum, this thesis concludes that the Keynesian state- and equality-
centric ideal has been, and continues to be, most important to SAP. Yet, from 
1948 to 1976/19794 this ideal was contested by Social Investment future- and 
multipurpose-centric ideal. From 1976/1979, the Neoliberal market- and 
autonomy-centric ideal has instead contested the Keynesian. Since the breakpoint 
in 1976/1979, the Social Investment ideal has steadily increased its influence. At 
last, the thesis propose ideas for how future research could shed even more light 
on the research problem at issue.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 Herein, 1976/1979 means 1976 or 1979. This, as the exact figures makes it hard to tell if 1976 or 1979 
represents the precise breakpoint.  
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2 Previous research 
In order to understand the developments of SAP, it is first necessary to consider 
the distinct charactersitcs of social democratic political parties as well as how 
these have developed over time – in general terms. It is also relevant to review the 
research which has already been done on the SAP in particular. Accordingly, the 
following section serves to answer three central questions; (1) what distingushes 
social democratic parites, (2) what do previous scholars suggest regarding 
(welfare) ideological developments of social democratic parties, and (3) what 
does the preexisting literture imply on SAP specific developments? Together, 
answering these three questions means both accounting for how this thesis’s 
research problem has been previously resolved as well as identifying gaps in the 
preexisting knowledge.  
2.1 The Industrial Revolution and employer-worker 
social cleavage 
The research done by the social scientists Seymour Martin Lipset (American) and 
Stein Rokkan (Norwegian) is relevant for this thesis at it sheds light on the birth 
and initial characteristics of social democratic political parties. Lipset and Rokkan 
provide a detailed explanation of the developments and characteristics of political 
systems overall. The authors present comprehensive suggestions for how to 
understand a particular polity, as they focus both on the behavior of political 
parties and the behavior of the electorate (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 1-2). With 
an emphasis on Western countries, Lipset and Rokkan carry out a comparative 
historical analysis, contrasting 13 political systems (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 2). 
The authors provide this thesis with important suggestions of how to 
understand the operational logic of political parties. Lipset and Rokkan argue that 
the characteristics of various political systems can be traced back to times of 
conflict (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 5). Conflicts cause social cleavages, i.e. 
dichotomous splits between concerned parties with polarized interest. The authors 
suggest that the particularities of setting give rise to certain forms of conflict 
(Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 6). Political parties serve to channel such contrasting 
interests. Lipset and Rokkan define political parties as ‘alliances in conflicts over 
policies and value commitments within the larger body politic’ (Lipset & Rokkan, 
1967, p. 5). Hence, the authors imply that political parties represent and express 
specific – opposing – interests (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 5-6). This insight 
motivates studying variation in SAP’s programmatic appeal over time, as SAP 
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statements – in the logic of Lipset and Rokkan – embody fundamental political 
disagreements of the contemporary society.  
Central for this thesis, Lipset and Rokkan consider the Industrial Revolution 
as especially important to the birth of social democracy. Industrialization – and its 
advanced production technologies – enhanced societal wealth. The authors 
suggest that conflicting economic interests during this period caused a cleavage 
between labor workers and capital owners (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 14, 19).  
The French political scientist Philippe Marlière concurs with the suggestion of 
conflict, between employers and workers, as fundamentally important to young 
European social democracy (Marlière, 1999, p. 1). As the economy prospered the 
wage-earners grew in number, resulting in a more powerful working-class. Lipset 
and Rokkan propose that this group had particular interests in labor market 
conditions and security (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 21). They mean that labor 
workers feeling ‘socially and culturally alienated from the [capital] owners and 
employers’ resulted in a ‘formation of a variety of labor unions and the 
development of nationwide Socialist parties’ (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 21). This 
happened in ‘every country of Europe’ (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 21, 35). 
However, the authors argue that it was not until the Russian Revolution in 1917 
that social democratic parties became a distinct subgroup to the general socialist 
‘lower-class mass parties’ (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 35).   
Marlière makes an important contribution to the understanding of early 
European social democracy. The author suggests that ‘[t]he historical aim of 
social democracy was to fight back the most oppressive aspects of capitalism’ 
(Marlière, 1999, p. 1). Relatedly, the author suggests that – once well established 
– the social democratic parties, in many countries of Europe, accounted for a 
monopoly of the support of the left-wing voters. Hence, social democratic parties 
could incorporate a substantial amount of right-wing ideas, without losing the 
political left (Marlière, 1999, p. 8-9).  
2.2 Developments of social democratic parties  
The preexisting research on developments of social democracy and social 
democratic parties is rather extensive. Therefore, subsequent presentation 
represents only a limited selection of research highly relevant for this thesis (i.e. 
focused mainly on ideological developments). As will show, scholars differ 
significantly in how they sentence the developments of social democratic parties.  
In 1998 the British sociologist Anthony Giddens wrote about the renewal of 
social democracy, suggesting that societal changes forced social democratic 
parties to deviate from classical social democracy – formulating a genre of third 
way politics (Giddens, 1998, p. 7, 26).  Giddens’s main focus is directed towards 
Britain, but the author argues that the conclusions of the study have 
geographically wider implications (Giddens, 1998, p. 2).  
Like Lipset and Rokkan, Giddens argues that social democracy grew from a 
symbiosis of socialism and early industrialization. The main concern for the 
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emerging social democratic parties was to construct extensive redistributive 
welfare state systems. Giddens suggests that this infant social democracy was 
considerably similar among western European countries. It rested on Keynesian 
economic ideals and considered comprehensive governmental involvement in 
citizens’ lives as desirable. Nevertheless, Giddens argues that social democratic 
parties later (partly) abandoned the left pole and have moved towards the center of 
the political spectrum (Giddens, 1998, p. 3-4, 6-7, 9, 17-18, 44, 46-47). This 
argumentation proposes that the circumstanced faced by SAP (identified by 
Oskarson and Demker) are not unique to the Swedish party. Instead, the puzzle of 
how initially hegemonic and rigid social democratic parties have adjusted to 
modern competition, seems to have geographically wider relevance.  
Giddens’s argumentation is included in this presentation as the core enigma of 
Giddens’s research substantially aligns with the research problem identified 
herein. Like this thesis, Giddens also dwells upon how social democracy has 
adjusted to the transformed political landscape. Accordingly, his study is relevant 
for this thesis as it provides explanations of the external pressure encountered by 
social democratic parties and the parties have responded to such pressure. Giddens 
argues that defining a political left and a political right always involves 
considerable ambiguity (Giddens, 1998, p. 37-38). According to Giddens, the 
move away from post-war socialism, towards contemporary market solutions, has 
blurred the distinction between left and right even more (Giddens, 1998, p. 43). 
The author suggests that there are currently ‘no alternatives to capitalism’ and 
social democracy needs to find its way to cope with this (Giddens, 1998, p. 24). 
Further, Giddens’s suggestions concur with Marlière’s argumentation. Marlière 
proposes that, originally, social democracy fought capitalism, but in later days the 
European parties have no longer had the capability to resist the right-wing 
sympathies. Instead, social democratic parties have incorporated traditional 
capitalist views in their own political agenda (Marlière, 1999, p. 1, 8-9).  
The developments also entail a more complex constellation of the electorate. 
In harmony with Oskarson and Demker, Giddens argues that party affiliation is no 
longer (as strongly) connected to socioeconomic class affiliation (Giddens, 1998, 
p. 23). Social democratic parties have lost their original industrial electorate as 
‘[t]he traditional working class has largely disappeared and the old working-class 
communities […] have altered their character’ (Giddens, 1998, p. 104). 
Furthermore, the author emphasizes the challenges of Europeanization, which 
involve decline in national autonomy and diversification of population 
compositions (Giddens, 1998, p. 134-135).  
Giddens’s analysis proposes that changes in the structure of the economy was 
the driving force behind social democratic ideological developments. The 1980s 
involved a spread of neoliberal ideals and trust in the free market (Giddens, 1998, 
p. 8, 17-18). With a lack of ‘a consistent ‘class block’ [of voters] on which to 
rely’, social democracy had to adapt to the capitalist society to retain 
parliamentary power (Giddens, 1998, p. 23). Accordingly, what Giddens refers to 
as ‘[t]hird way [social democratic] politics’ was born (Giddens, 1998, p. 99). In 
essence, Giddens suggests third way politics to (Giddens, 1998, p. 100): 
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[look] […] for a synergy between public and private sectors, utilizing the dynamism of 
markets but with the public interest in mind. It involves a balance between regulation and 
deregulation, […] and a balance between the economic and the non-economic in the life 
of the society. 
 
This is however as far as Giddens goes in specifying this third way social 
democracy. His study lacks a more lucid description of the means and structure of 
such politics. Importantly though, Giddens suggests that – if social democracy 
finds its third way – it ‘can not only survive, but prosper’ (Giddens, 1998, p. vii). 
Yet, the author suggests that finding a prosperous third way would require social 
democrats ‘to revise their pre-existing views more thoroughly than most have 
done so far’ (Giddens, 1998, p. vii).  
In short, Giddens’s research provides this thesis with three important insights. 
After the Second World War the distinction between politics of left and right has 
(1) been blurred. This has led to (2) social democratic parties losing their original 
support group. Thus, (3) only studying traits of left versus right in social 
democratic ideology development will not reveal the entire truth.  
In 2002, the French political scientist Gerassimos Moschonas performed a 
study similar to Giddens’s. Like Giddens’s, Moschonas historical analysis aims to 
unravel the transformation of social democracy from the end of the Second World 
War until the turn of the twenty-first century (Moschonas, 2002, p. 4, 7). Yet, 
Moschonas’s study has slightly wider implications as the author suggests ways to 
understand the developments of European social democracy ‘in its entirety’ 
without focusing on the unique characteristics of specific political systems 
(Moschonas, 2002, p. 7). Moschonas considers changes in social democratic party 
ideology as a continual premise, suggesting that ‘[t]he overall social-democratic 
cartography is changing’ (Moschonas, 2002, p. 318). In contrast to Giddens’s, the 
focus of Moschonas’s analysis is directed mainly towards the operational logic of 
social democratic parties. The author suggests that the parties’ former stability has 
been replaced by modern flexibility (Moschonas, 2002, p. 320).  
Moschonas also emphasizes social democratic parties’ initial close 
relationship with a particular part of the electorate. According to Moschonas, 
early post-war social democracy was characterized by a unique ’system of action’ 
(Moschonas, 2002, p. 313). This system involved a close relationship to a certain 
set of institutions and a certain electorate. Social democratic parties had a firm 
connection to labor unions and appealed (almost exclusively) to the ‘traditional 
working class’ (Moschonas, 2002, p. 313).  
How then did this system of action cope over time? Moschonas suggests the 
early post-war social democracy was significantly anchored in left-wing political 
ideology, emphasizing equality (Moschonas, 2002, p. 313, 315). However, 
Moschonas argues this social democratic originality was lost half a century after 
the end of the Second World War (Moschonas, 2002, p. 313-314). Instead, social 
democratic parties had transformed into ordinary political forces and hence 
abandoned their ‘social democratic modus operandi’ (Moschonas, 2002, p. 314). 
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This involved breaking the close link to previously mentioned institutions and 
electorate (Moschonas, 2002, p. 313-314, 316, 319).  
Moschonas also provides important suggestions to why SAP’s operational 
logic might have changed. First, Moschonas stresses the parties’ attitude towards 
the electorate as one important aspect. Furthermore, former political and 
institutional stability was discarded in favor of ‘tactical flexibility’ (Moschonas, 
2002, p. 320). The author argues that, during the second half of the twentieth 
century, social democratic parties began utilizing momentarily adaptability (i.e. 
rapid adjustment to the public opinion) to the electorate as a competitive 
advantage against other political parties (Moschonas, 2002, p. 320). The 
‘ideological and programmatic flexibility’ meant that the social democrats are 
very sensitive to the contemporary opinions of the – now inconstant – electorate 
(Moschonas, 2002, p. 320).  
Moschonas research is further relevant for this thesis since it provides an 
indication of how to suitably picture the developments of social democracy. 
Moschonas suggests that the ideological developments vary between political 
systems and that the developments within a particular system have been nothing 
but linear. However, he identifies abandoning a glorification of Keynesian 
economic ideas in favor of the market economy, as a common neoliberal trait 
(Moschonas, 2002, p. 316-318, 323-324). Yet, the author claims that ‘[s]ocial 
democracy is not dead’ (Moschonas, 2002, p. 10). Moschonas concludes that 
‘[s]ocial democracy certainly still seeks to ally in one project the celebrated 
‘invisible hand’ of liberalism with the ‘visible hand’ of the state’ (Moschonas, 
2002, p. 321). Nevertheless, recent ideological flexibility illustrates a new social 
democracy which – due to its electoral vulnerability – ‘displays greater openness 
to new sensibilities, whether left, right, or ‘neither left nor right’’ (Moschonas, 
2002, p. 320).  
The last sentence is crucial here. In harmony with Giddens, Moschonas’s 
emphasis on neither left nor right signals that a rewarding analysis must tackle 
developments of social democracy with perspectives that go beyond the 
dichotomous left and right. Additionally, Moschonas’s analysis enlightens this 
thesis on three important items. (1) Social democratic parties have lost their 
former ideological stability in favor of modern flexibility. (2) The developments 
over the last 50 years have, thus, been none-linear. Finally, (3) since social 
democratic parties have lost their close connection to a homogeneous group of 
voters, they now have to continuously persuade a heterogenous and unreliable 
electorate.  
In their entirety, the fundamentals of Giddens’s and Moschonas’s analyses 
concur – social democracy remains as a political force, but the manifestation of 
the parties’ ideology has been (considerably) adjusted to please the modern 
electorate. To illustrate a body of literature at conflict with this view, this thesis 
includes the research of the Australian social scientist Ashley Lavelle. In 2008, 
Lavelle performed an analysis of developments in social democracy by examining 
the Australian, British, German and Swedish systems (Lavelle, 2008, p. 7). The 
author seeks to answer the question: ‘Is the neo-liberalization of social democracy 
just a passing phase, or is the project beyond repair?’ (Lavelle, 2008, p. 1). 
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Lavelle’s simple answer is yes, the project is beyond repair as ‘social democracy 
is dead’ (Lavelle, 2008, p. 1).  
Lavelle refers to the first three decades after the Second World War as the 
’golden era’ of social democracy (Lavelle, 2008, p. 9). The author suggests that 
the prosperity of social democracy was significantly dependent on post-war 
economic growth. Supposedly, the flourishing economy was suitably combined 
with social democratic Keynesian economic ideals of an active state, urging 
private consumption (Lavelle, 2008, p. 9, 20).  
However, the 1970s decline in economic growth, according to Lavelle, also 
became the fall of social democracy (Lavelle, 2008, p. 12, 20). The author 
suggests that ‘[w]hen the international recession struck in the mid-1970s, 
traditional Keynesian measures proved incapable of restoring previous growth and 
employment levels’ (Lavelle, 2008, p. 33). To be willing to invest in the economy, 
citizens demanded implementation of policies that facilitated private profitability. 
Lavelle argues the implementation of such policies to implicate a paradigm shift 
towards embracing neoliberalism as the political ideal (Lavelle, 2008, p. 26, 32-
33). The author claims all other conventional explanations to why social 
democratic parties made a neoliberal turn – such as Europeanization, globalization 
or change in the electorate – to be caused by the decline in economic growth 
(Lavelle, 2008, p. 26).  
Why then did this implementation of neoliberal policies pose the death of 
social democracy? Lavelle argues that the changes that took place from the 1970s 
and onwards undermined the most fundamental characteristics of social 
democratic politics (Lavelle, 2008, p. 1-2). The author means that ‘[n]eo-
liberalism is fundamentally at odds with social democracy’ (Lavelle, 2008, p. 21). 
He essentially stresses three aspects which render contemporary social democracy 
unrecognizable to its former self. First, social democratic parties no longer have 
any special relationship to labor unions. Instead, these are treated just as one 
interest group among many. Second, Lavelle suggests that social democratic 
parties no longer distinctively strive to even out wealth inequalities (Lavelle, 
2008, p. 11-12, 14-16). Third, ‘social democrats today have no intentions of 
reforming capitalism’ (Lavelle, 2008, p. 11). Cumulatively, these three factors 
stipulate the death of social democracy. Lavelle claims that – as there is no 
foreseeable alternative to the contemporary capitalist system – traditional left-
wing social democracy is unlikely to be resurrected (Lavelle, 2008, p. 19, 21, 26). 
Lavelle makes another interesting point. According to Lavelle, ‘policy regimes 
are converging […] to the right’, and hence ‘there are no longer any significant 
[political] oppositions’ (Lavelle, 2008, p. 38). Supposedly, the general 
convergence of political parties urges the emergence of political extremes 
(Lavelle, 2008, p. 37). (Thus, Lavelle draws conclusions in line with Oskarson 
and Demker’s suggestions about the upsurge of The Sweden Democrats, but in a 
wider international perspective). 
Lavelle’s research is of high importance for this thesis. The observant reader 
might have noticed that the elements of Lavelle’s analysis do not, in fact, differ 
that much from Giddens’s and Moschonas’s. Instead, merely the assessment of 
the elements’ meaning is at conflict. Whilst Giddens and Moschonas identify a 
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new type of old social democracy, Lavelle preaches that social democracy is no 
more. Thus, Lavelle’s study shows that – despite opposite conclusions – some 
(common) aspects are favorably included in any study on transformations of 
social democracy. These aspects include (1) the constellation of the electorate, (2) 
tension between the political left and the political right, (3) elaborations on the 
conflict between Keynesian and neoliberal ideals.  
2.3 Developments of SAP 
In regards of research on SAP, there is a multitude of scholars narrowly 
examining only certain aspects of the party’s politics. The existing literature on 
specific polices and decisions is tremendous. Nevertheless, profound research on 
general developments of SAP’s ideology is far more scarce.  
One of the best examples of such rare research is found in the Swedish 
political scientist Herbert Tingsten’s work from 1941. Tingsten performs a 
thorough analysis of SAP, using a multitude of material communicated by the 
party itself. These include party leader statements (written and oral), debates held 
in the Riksdag, SAP policy proposals and more. The analysis takes off at the birth 
of SAP in the late 1800s and terminates in the 1940s (Tingsten, 1973, p. 707; 
Tomasson, 1973, p. vii).  
Tingsten’s research is important to this thesis since it accounts for SAP’s 
(early) ideological response to the dissolution of a distinct political left and right. 
Tingsten shows that SAP – like social democratic parties in general – has been 
sensitive to changes in its surroundings. The focus of this thesis is thereby even 
more firmly motivated. However – partly due to the temporal constraint – 
Tingsten’s propositions do not precisely consider this thesis’s research problem. 
Instead, the author’s implications are more focused on the overall density of SAP 
ideology (in contrast to this thesis’s interest in the explicit components of such 
ideology). Yet, Tingsten’s suggestions are included herein, as his research 
postulates one of the more profound argumentations on SAP developments. 
Tingsten identifies the initial period of SAP’s history as significantly tinged by 
classical Marxist ideology (Tomasson, 1973, p. xi). However, the author means 
that such extreme statements were soon muted. Instead, SAP changed its political 
profile – which was fully-fledged in the 1930s – towards becoming a party with 
welfare put at the top of the agenda (Tingsten, 1973, p. 698, 706-706). 
Looking at the later years of the analysis, Tingsten recognizes a considerable 
decline in ideological relevance (Tingsten, 1973, p. 714; Tomasson, 1973, p. viii). 
The decline was not only noteworthy for SAP’s rhetoric, but ‘the traditional 
ideologies […] had become highly attenuated in Sweden [overall] and were 
replaced by a far-reaching consensus politics’ (Tomasson, 1973, p. viii).  
Unfortunately, without detailed explanation, Tingsten proposes the 
developments of SAP to be caused by a multitude of factors. Among these, 
Tingsten mentions economic circumstances but makes sure to point out that 
economy is not the only factor driving ideological development. SAP 
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developments are to be regarded as responses to contemporary circumstances in 
general, both national and international (Tingsten, 1973, p. 712-713). In a 
nutshell, Tingsten describes ‘the character of [Swedish] Social Democratic 
development […] as an inevitable process of ideological dissolution’ (Tingsten, 
1973, p. 714).   
In 1980, the political scientist Diane Sainsbury (born in America but later 
settled in Sweden) partly took off where Tingsten terminated. Sainsbury argues 
that research outside the scope of Marxism is needed (Sainsbury, 1980, p. 5). 
Focusing on SAP, Sainsbury asks ‘[w]hat role does ideology play in electoral 
politics’ and ‘[w]hat effects does electoral politics have on ideology?’ (Sainsbury, 
1980, p. 4). Sainsbury’s analysis focuses on election campaigns between the years 
1944 and 1948. The author turns to various types of material – all with the aim to 
spread social democratic election propaganda (Sainsbury, 1980, p. 13-14, 18). 
Sainsbury focuses on the presence of ideological statements in the material. 
She defines ideology as a combination of statements including (1) perceptions of 
what reality is like and (2) opinions of how reality should be and how to get there 
(Sainsbury, 1980, p. 7-8).  
Sainsbury herself suggests her work to be of certain importance as it provides 
research on SAP written in English and as it focuses on ideology beyond the 
conceptual boarders of Marxism (Sainsbury, 1980, p. 5). In sum, the author 
suggests that (Sainsbury, 1980, abstract): 
 
modifications and persistent elements in ideological content can be explained by tactical 
uses, thus suggesting that the effects of tactical functions on ideological content may 
furnish a valuable perspective in understanding aspects of the revision process of party 
ideology.  
 
Sainsbury’s contribution to this thesis is of a slightly different character then the 
contributions of the other scholars. Like Tingsten, neither Sainsbury addresses the 
detailed content of SAP’s ideological substance. Accordingly, Sainsbury’s 
research offers little insight into the character of SAP’s ideological developments. 
Yet, her work has important implications for how to operationalize abstract party 
ideology to concrete measurements. Accordingly, this thesis makes important use 
of Sainsbury’s suggestions both when defining welfare ideology and formulating 
operational indicators for such ideology.  
A more recent study was done by the Swedish political scientist Jonas 
Hinnfors in 2006. Jonas Hinnfors performs an in-depth analysis, focused 
particularly on SAP’s attitude towards the market. Hinnfors makes articulated 
claims precisely about the stability in SAP’s view on the welfare system. Hence, 
his study relates strongly to this thesis’s research problem.  
The author asks if SAP really has ‘become a neo-liberal party?’ (Hinnfors, 
2006, p. 71). Hinnfors carries out the analysis based on the hypothesis that – 
despite short turn fluctuations in political advocacy – the ‘overarching ideology 
[of the party] remains stable over time’ (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 16). Further, he 
denotes the idea of the desirable welfare state as one of the ideologically stable 
issues (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 16). Hinnfors’s SAP specific suggestions, in other 
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words, somewhat oppose Giddens’s, Moschonas’s and Lavelle’s analyses of 
general traits of social democratic ideology. Hinnfors seems to suggest that SAP – 
in contrast to the general developments – has not changed its overarching 
ideology in any remarkable way.  
Hinnfors’s argumentation of fundamental SAP characteristics also differs 
from the general implications. Hinnfors suggests that even early SAP rhetoric 
involved a ‘market-economy friendly approach’ (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 72). 
Supposedly, this approach embraced the idea that Sweden was in some aspects 
dependent on the (international) market, and the welfare state should merely 
complement the market functions. In its early days, however, the market friendly 
approach was rather subtle. Instead, (without a detailed explanation to why so), 
Hinnfors suggests the mid-1980s to constitute a break through for explicit support 
for the market economy (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 74-76, 79-80, 82). ‘Gone was most of 
the socialist prose’ (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 79). The author implies that this rhetorical 
change was due to societal changes. As privatization and entrepreneurship had 
become catchwords of the economy, these were also included in the welfare state 
discourse (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 82, 84).  In conclusion, Hinnfors suggests that all 
(Swedish) political parties are dependent on ‘international capitalism’ but that 
‘SAP have found the dependency rewarding and in general have been positive 
towards the market’ (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 84). 
Hinnfors’s research provides this thesis with an indication of that SAP has not 
exactly followed the general developments of social democratic ideology. Instead, 
it motivates further research on the unique characteristics of the Swedish party.  
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3 Purpose  
This section motivates the perspective taken in this thesis. First, it identifies gaps 
in preexisting research. Second, it presents this thesis’s research question. Third, it 
explains how answering this question involves filling the gaps in previous 
research. Thereafter, it explains why this thesis is relevant even beyond the 
research field of political science. Finally, it presents and motivates content 
delimitations and notion definitions involved in this thesis.  
3.1 Gaps in preexisting research  
The research presented above provides this thesis with an important foundation, 
necessary to perform delicate research on SAP’s welfare ideology. However, there 
are a number of insufficiencies connected to previous scholars’ research. First, 
there is a deficit in studies that focus on recent developments in SAP’s general 
welfare ideology. Second and consequently, there is a need for a systematic 
comparison over a long period of time. Such long-term analysis is necessary (1) to 
distinguish swift fluctuations from lasting changes in SAP’s welfare ideology, and 
(2) to disentangle the (partly) conflicting suggestion of previous scholars. Third, 
the preexisting research lacks a detailed decomposition of the ideological 
elements in SAP’s welfare advocacy. Previous scholars pay too little attention to 
the interplay between different ideological perspectives. Fourth, there is (yet) no 
analytical tool sophisticated enough to perform such analysis.  
3.2 Research question 
Based on findings and flaws in previous research, this thesis aims to answer the 
research question:  
 
How can developments in SAP’s welfare ideology over the past 70 years be understood, 
using the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare 
ideals? 
 
Answering this explicit research question involves systematically approaching the 
research problem postulated in the introduction of this thesis; how the initially 
hegemonic and politically rigid SAP has adjusted its core concern – the structure 
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of the welfare state – to survive in a modern environment tinged by intensified 
competition and change in rules of the political game.  
3.3 Scientific and popular relevance  
This thesis is scientifically relevant as it supplements previous research by filling 
the gaps identified in section above It does so, firstly, by involving an 
examination of modern SAP developments. Secondly, the thesis allows a long-
term analysis (spanning over 70 years). Thirdly, this thesis generates a 
comprehensive analytical tool, tailor-made to examine welfare ideology. This tool 
is the thesis’s most important contribution to the research field. Furthermore, the 
thesis is relevant as it examines how the hegemonic SAP has developed in times 
when the cleavage that created the party no longer is at the top of the social 
agenda. Finally, the thesis contributes to the research field by utilizing a method 
different from the commonly dominating. Instead of a qualitative approach, this 
thesis exploits quantitative tools5. Accordingly, not only the content of this 
thesis’s results, but also how they are generated, supplement the preexisting 
literature. The methodological contribution is important since scientific 
knowledge is, overall, enriched by synchronizing the findings of qualitative and 
quantitative research (King et al., 1994, p. 4-6). Relatedly, the findings of this 
thesis are discussed in close relation to previous scholars’ suggestions.  
This thesis also has important popular relevance, i.e. relevance outside of the 
academics’ ivory tower. Concisely, the structure of the Swedish welfare system 
affects each and every one of the population. From the cradle to the grave, the 
individual is (sometimes involuntarily) exposed to welfare services. Further, 
opinions on how to organize the welfare system constitute a core part of the 
political debate. In a representative democracy like Sweden, it is therefore 
important that the electorate is properly informed of the various political parties’ 
suggestions. This thesis provides such information about SAP – Sweden’s, 
through history, biggest party and the core creator of the foundation for continued 
Swedish welfare. Consequently, the presentation is relevant for the layman who 
wishes to disentangle parts of the alien current situation described in the 
introduction.   
The thesis is not only relevant for researchers and the ordinary population (qua 
the electorate), it can also serve to enlighten professional politicians. This, as the 
thesis provides reflection on if SAP remains what they initially promised to be. 
Furthermore, the analysis uncovers how short-term decisions – in the run-up for 
elections – affect the appearance of SAP’s coherent, long-run, approach. Jointly, it 
can help politicians understand the electoral support for SAP. Ultimately, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 The suitability of quantitative tools is discussed at length below, see section 5 (Material and method).  
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thesis touches upon SAP’s ability to steer Sweden in a different direction than 
other political parties would.  
The three types of relevance, discussed above, are not limited by Swedish 
national frontiers. Instead, since developments in various European party systems 
tend to have important common traits, this thesis might also be relevant to other 
polities in Europe (Gallagher et al., 2011, p. 238-240, 251-251).  
 
3.4 Delimitations 
This thesis involves three important delimitations. First, the thesis exclusively 
examines developments, of the welfare ideology advocated by SAP, from the end 
of the Second World War until today (i.e. 1945 to 2017). Moreover, SAP 
developments other than of welfare ideology fall outside the scope of this paper.  
SAP had its breakthrough in the 1930s, just in the run-up to the Second World 
War. Then, the advocated welfare state was (rather) limited and directed to a 
minority of the Swedish population (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 84, 86-87). The 
period after the war involved further popular establishment of the party 
(Moschonas, 2002, p. 313-315). However, in the post-war period SAP faced a 
demographic structure considerably different from the one of the 1930s. In the 
aftermath of the war and the industrialization it had brought about, the Swedish 
middleclass grew in size. SAP thus had to widen its welfare state model to attract 
the new average Swedish citizen. This represents the time when SAP launched 
their idea of a generally applicable and class neutral welfare state (Esping-
Andersen, 1994, p. 88). Accordingly, the year 1945 – commonly accepted as the 
end of the Second World War – poses a motivated starting point for this thesis. 
In general, previous scholars have paid significant attention to the decades just 
after the Second World War. The research on this golden era of (SAP-) social 
democracy is extensive. However, research on later times is more scarce. To 
enrich the research filed, this thesis therefore uses the year 2017 – the time of 
writing – as its end point for the temporal analysis. This end point is further 
motivated as it allows the thesis to analyze both short- (for example between the 
elections in 1948 and 1952) and long-term SAP developments (for example 
between the golden era and today). 
Second, the thesis exclusively utilizes three conceptual lenses6 to examine 
SAP developments. This thesis includes Keynesian welfare ideals because these 
represent the basis for the initial construction of the Swedish Social Democratic 
post-war welfare state and hence the Swedish Model (Ellison, 2006, p. 411). 
Neoliberal welfare ideals, on the other hand, are included as they represent a 
critique towards Keynesianism. Hence, the Neoliberal ideals herein function as an 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 The names of the conceptual lenses are henceforth written with a capital first letter, this to indicate that I am 
referring to the specific fictional archetypes modeled herein.  
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opposite to Keynesianism, to which SAP has had to adapt (Offe, 2006, p. 67). 
Finally, focusing solely on Keynesian and Neoliberal ideals means neglecting 
important aspects of SAP’s developments. Therefore, the thesis includes Social 
Investment ideals as a third lens. Social Investment ideals are relevant when 
analyzing SAP as they are argued to both represent a completely new way to 
structure welfare and yet to have been important in Swedish policy making since 
the early post-war period (Esping-Andersen, 2006b, p. 446; Lister, 2006, p. 455-
467). Furthermore, Social Investment ideals (partly) challenge the idea of 
Keynesian and Neoliberal ideals being incompatible. By simultaneously 
borrowing from and rejecting the aforementioned lenses, Social Investment ideals 
provide a needful complement to the analysis (Lister, 2006, p. 455-467).  
Third, examining why political parties modify their ideology falls outside the 
scope of this thesis. Instead, the understanding that parties adjust their political 
position over time is considered a given assumption. This assumption rests mainly 
on Anthony Downs’s suggestions on behavior of political parties.  In 1957 Downs 
presented a theory on why political parties act like they do. Downs claims that 
political parties are interested in holding office only for the sake of power and 
glory, not to improve the wellbeing of the inhabitants of the polity (Downs, 1957, 
p. 28). Consequently, maximizing the number of votes is the main goal of the 
party which ‘manipulates its policies and actions in whatever way it believes will 
gain it the most votes’ (Downs, 1957, p. 31). Given that society is not static, 
Downs’ argumentation motivates examining political alternations over a 
considerable time span, and allows the assumption that SAP has modified its 
ideological stance over time.  
3.5 Definitions of notions  
The term welfare ideology can be considered the very alfa and omega of this 
thesis. In fact, it can be broken down into two separate notions; (1) welfare and 
(2) ideology. (Table 1 provides a bullet point summary of how the concepts are 
herein defined.) 
Starting with ideology, it is herein defined as (borrowing the words of the 
Finnish political scientist Andreas Fagerholm) a ‘coherent set of ideas’ 
(Fagerholm, 2016, p. 144). These ideas are inherently subjective and driven by 
non-universal values (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 142-144). Further, the ideas involve 
perceptions both of what is and what ought to be, as well as how to get there 
(Sainsbury, 1980, p. 7-8, 10). Finally, the specific sets of ideas (i.e. ideologies) are 
primarily communicated by political parties (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 152-153).  
Accordingly, ideologies are favorably studied by examining manifestos 
produced by the parties themselves (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 152-153). Furthermore, 
considering an ideology as a set of ideas expressed through august ideals, means 
that systematically studying party ideals equals studying political ideology 
(Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 141).   
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Turning to the notion of welfare then, this thesis adopts a ‘social policy 
perspective’ of welfare (Bent, 2008, p. 54). Thereby, the thesis regards welfare as 
political parties’ concerns of how to organize society, focusing mainly on the 
population’s living standard. Welfare is thus normative and channeled through 
policy instruments. The instruments include management directions, expressions 
of wanted goals and means to measure the instruments’ performance. Further, the 
instruments involve statements on the division of public- and private sector 
responsibilities (Bent, 2008, p. 53-54, 58).  
 
Table 1 – Definitions of ideology and welfare 
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4 Theoretical framework 
This section presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. It serves to identify 
what the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment 
welfare ideals mean, and how they are related (over time). The passage mainly 
involves suggestions made by Anton Hemerijck and Jane Jenson. Hemerijck 
describes general traits in welfare state developments, and suggests 
socioeconomic factors as the prime cause of these changes. Jenson, on the other 
hand, pays closer attention to details of the different welfare state approaches. 
Jointly, Hemerijck’s and Jenson’s suggestions provide a theoretical springboard 
for how to structure and observe traits of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social 
Investment ideals.  
The Dutch political scientist and sociologist Anton Hemerijck argues that post 
World War Two developments of welfare states should be regarded as three 
waves of changes. The waves are suggested to be strongly connected to 
contemporary socioeconomic circumstances. In general, Hemerijck views 
economic crises as opportunities for potential political changeover. Thus, the 
author offers a ‘three-stage developmental sequence’, explaining general trends in 
the structure of welfare systems from 1945 until today (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 33).  
Hemerijck’s conceptions are included in the present thesis firstly as they 
provide a long-term understanding of the challenges met by European 
policymakers as well as how ideology has evolved to fit the socioeconomic 
climate. Secondly, Hemerijck’s three-stage model of development can thus be 
used as a benchmark for Swedish social democratic ideology – a point of 
reference to tell if SAP has followed or deviated from the general evolution of 
welfare ideology. Thirdly, the temporal development presented by Hemerijck 
emphasizes the relevance of Keynesianism, Neoliberalism and Social Investment 
as conceptual lenses through which we might examine SAP ideology.  In addition, 
Hemerijck’s conclusions are in line with the three welfare ideals presented by 
Jenson, thereby creating harmony in the theoretical framework.   
Hemerijck’s first wave emerged in connection to the war ending. Society was 
characterized by extensive industrialization and a need to care for the population 
of a war-torn Europe. The circumstances called for a wave of welfare state 
expansion (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 33, 35). The author suggests that Keynesian 
economic theory constituted the pillar for the era of welfare state expansion. State 
expenditures functioned as an opposite pole to private spending – reducing the 
effects of economic fluctuations (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34, 37).  
The status of the citizens evolved to encompass the ‘right’ to social protection 
(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34). Full employment and income transfers became the 
catchwords of the era. Yet, the wave of welfare state expansion involved a narrow 
view of its participants. Hemerijck suggests that the state focused primarily on 
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protecting male industrial workers from unemployment (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 35, 
37-38). In sum, Hemerijck suggests that the first wave of welfare state 
development was based on Keynesian economic theory, which (Hemerijck, 2012, 
p. 34):  
 
provided the intellectual ammunition for the post-war construction and expansion of the 
modern welfare state, based on demand stabilisation through income-transfer social 
insurance provision with male-breadwinner full employment as the prime objective.  
 
By contrast, Hemerijck’s second wave of welfare state development was 
characterized by Neoliberal retrenchment. The author suggests that a decline in 
the post-war economic growth was crucial to the onset of the second wave. 
Hemerijck claims that the 1970s’ Bretton Woods collapse and the later oil crises 
were the tipping point of expansive welfare policies (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 33, 39-
40).  
If unemployment was the state’s fear during the era of welfare state expansion, 
escalating inflation and monetary instability were the threats of the second wave. 
A mistrust in the state’s capability to simultaneously maintain wide-ranging social 
benefits and handle emerging mass unemployment called for increased faith in the 
market forces (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 40-41). Hemerijck suggests that downscaling 
reforms replaced state authorities with individual responsibility for wellbeing. The 
author explains that the Neoliberal wave involved replacing social policies 
intended to enhance demand (i.e. the population’s purchasing power), by supply-
oriented means, making the tie between employer and employee more flexible 
(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 39, 41-43). In essence, Hemerijck argues that (Hemerijck, 
2012, p. 43): 
 
Well-functioning markets were seen as the best guarantee for wellbeing, self-reliance and 
autonomy. Inequality is inherent in markets and even necessary to motivate self-sufficient 
individuals as economic actors.  
 
According to Hemerijck, the third wave of welfare state developments emerged in 
a slightly different way than the two previous eras. The first and the second wave 
both sprung from severe economic recessions. The third wave – of Social 
Investment policies – instead involved a ‘disenchantment with neoliberal policy 
prescriptions’ (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34). Hence, whilst the first and second wave 
are considered economically rooted, the third wave rests on political concerns 
(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34).  
Contemporary characteristics of the social environment are key in 
understanding the wave of Social Investment welfare. Instead of an industrial 
society (faced the first wave and partly the second wave), Hemerijck describes the 
society of the third wave as post-industrial and knowledge-based (Hemerijck, 
2012, p. 46, 48). Accordingly, the socioeconomic damage done by the 1990s’ 
currency crisis and the financial crisis in 2008 required very different political 
tools from those applied in the early post-war era (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34, 44, 46). 
Hemerijck claims that the major political argument, embedded in the third wave, 
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was a view that the market alone might be an insufficient security provider for 
some societal issues. These include, for example, in-work poverty and single 
parenthood (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46, 48). Therefore, the state regained authority in 
specific areas, since (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46):  
 
[T]he social investment perspective sees improved social equity go hand in hand with 
more economic efficiency. Social policy provisions are viewed as investments, potentially 
enhancing both social protection and productive potential.   
 
Hemerijck thus provides a temporal yardstick for evolutions of welfare ideology, 
which can be summarized as follows. The social climate after the Second World 
War called for times of welfare state expansion. However, the later decline of 
economic growth combined with unfortunate events in the economic sector during 
the 1970s, resulted in Neoliberal retrenchments of the welfare state – limiting the 
role of the state. However, a growing skepticism in the market’s unprecedented 
ability to assure the population’s wellbeing sparked a 1990s retrieve of state 
capabilities in a wave of Social Ínvestment ideals.    
The Canadian social scientist Jane Jenson proposes a means to analyze recent 
trends in welfare provision, comparing these to previously prominent 
perspectives. The author labels current developments as inspired by Social 
Investment ideals, and contrasts it to Keynesian and Neoliberal welfare ideology 
(Jenson, 2012, p. 65-67). Applying Jenson’s analytical grid is considered 
appropriate as she provides a framework suitable for the time period considered in 
this study (from the year 1945 until today). Accordingly, Jenson’s conceptual 
lenses harmonize with Hemerijck’s suggestions. Figure 1 provides an illustration 
of how Jenson’s and Hemerijcks understandings can be combined. Whereas 
Hemerijck lays out the socioeconomic context in place during each wave of 
welfare state development, Jenson complements his study by deeper 
conceptualizations.  
 
Figure 1 – Conceptual lenses and waves of welfare state developments combined 
 
 
 
Jenson structures her conceptualization of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social 
Investment welfare ideals around a particular analytical outline; the citizenship 
regime (Jenson, 2012, p. 66-67, 71, 75). Jenson describes the citizenship regime 
as involving aspects of ‘rights and duties, access and governance, and the 
responsibility mix’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 66). The ‘rights and duties’ concern whom is 
entitled to social security and under which conditions (Jenson, 2012, p. 71). The 
‘governance dimension’ refers to how the social services are structured, including 
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the distribution between centralization and decentralization, and between the 
public and the private sector (Jenson, 2012, p. 75). Finally, the ‘responsibility 
mix’ refers to who bears the main responsibility for the health and security of the 
citizens of a polity (Jenson, 2012, p. 67).  
The following section presents the essence of Jenson’s three welfare 
ideologies. The presentation follows Jenson’s analytical structure. However, as 
detailed as they are, this thesis’s research design requires some completion of 
Jenson’s suggestions. To enable a comprehensive analysis, the implications of 
Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals are supplemented 
with ideas of additional scholars.  
4.1 The conceptual lens of Keynesian welfare ideals 
At core, this thesis considers the Keynesian welfare ideals as state- and equality-
centric. The state should protect the citizens in general and ensure social equity in 
particular. The following passages present the content of the conceptual lens of 
Keynesian welfare ideals in detail.  
4.1.1 Rights and duties in Keynesian welfare 
Jenson describes Keynesian welfare ideals as centered around the goal of full 
employment for the male part of the population. Keynesian ideals consider the 
male breadwinner as the core target of welfare rights and duties. The man must 
work but is also entitled social protection via his connection to the labor market. 
The major duty of the younger part of the population is to complete the 
compulsory education (Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73).  
Jenson describes the main function of Keynesian social services to be to 
enhance equality among the population (Jenson, 2012, p. 71). The author claims 
Keynesian equality to be ‘equality of condition’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 72). Such 
equality is ensured through universal rights, assigning the state a high level of 
responsibility for the population’s ‘security and social protection’ (Jenson, 2012, 
p. 71). Unemployment, poor health and old age are considered the major pitfalls 
for the population’s ability to care for themselves. When the citizens face such 
social risks, the state shall intervene and protect its citizens (Jenson, 2012, p. 72).   
The rights and duties are further elaborated by additional scholars. Moschonas 
especially emphasizes that, in line with Keynesian welfare ideals, the citizens 
have the right to be protected against labor market insecurities (Moschonas, 2002, 
p. 66). In a similar vein, the sociologists Carl-Ulrik Schierup (Danish/Swedish) 
and Stephen Castles (Australian) explain that the state is obliged to protect the 
(male) workers (Schierup & Castles, 2014, p 255).   
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4.1.2 Access and governance in Keynesian welfare 
Jenson suggests the Keynesian ideal welfare system to be considerably 
hierarchical. It should be clear which authority is accountable in the extensive 
state bureaucracy. The state is given substantial responsibility for the wellbeing of 
its citizens, whereas the private sector is considered a ‘[w]ealth-creating sector’ 
(Jenson, 2012, p. 75). The author argues regulating spending to be a key task of 
the bureaucratic system. This because success is understood in terms of the 
amount of input spent on welfare creating services (Jenson, 2012, p. 75).  
In addition to the state as protector of the citizens, Jenson claims Keynesian 
welfare ideals to encourage organization of interest groups. Such associations are 
considered to play an important role in guarding certain interests, as well as 
favoring the representativeness in representative democracies (Jenson, 2012, p. 
75, 77).   
Janet Newman et al. adds to the aspect of access and governance in Keynesian 
welfare by suggesting that social services – according to this conceptual lens – 
should be standardized (Newman et al., 2014, p. 370). Additionally, Moschonas 
emphasizes that social services should be equally available among the citizens and 
that wealth, in general, should be evenly distributed (Moschonas, 2002, p. 21, 63). 
The Dutch social scientist Johan De Deken adds further to this understanding, 
suggesting that Keynesian welfare ideals encourage social services to be generous 
and easily accessible (De Deken, 2014, p. 266). This means that social services 
are provided (also) to passive citizens (for example, people who are not actively 
participating in the labor market) (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 51).  
4.1.3 The responsibility mix in Keynesian welfare 
Jenson argues the Keynesian state to have a far reaching balancing function. In 
regards of caring for the population’s wellbeing, the state is to supplement the 
market as well as the family. Expenditures of the state shall function as an 
opposite pole to private spending, hence balancing business cycle fluctuations. 
Further, the state shall be there to protect and secure the citizens in times of 
‘inadequate or limited market access’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 67). In essence, Jenson 
claims that the Keynesian ideal state ‘[s]hould spend to provide protection against 
social risks’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 68).  
Moschonas elaborates further on the responsibilities of the Keynesian state. In 
harmony with Jenson, he suggests that this state should be considerably active and 
influential, and that the welfare system overall should be organized around state 
institutions. Furthermore, the responsibility of the Keynesian state reaches only 
within the country’s geographical frontiers. Thus, the state takes on a national 
perspective and the economy is managed through consumption- (i.e. demand) 
oriented means (Moschonas, 2002, p. 63, 262).   
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4.2 The conceptual lens of Neoliberal welfare ideals 
This thesis considers the Neoliberal welfare ideals as utterly different from the 
Keynesian ideals. Herein, Neoliberal welfare ideals are considered as market- and 
autonomy-centric. Social services should be provided by the market and the 
individual should have ultimate control over her life. The following passages 
describe the content of the conceptual lens of Neoliberalism in detail.  
4.2.1 Rights and duties in Neoliberal welfare  
Jenson suggests that ‘dismantling many of these [Keynesian universal] citizenship 
rights’ stands at the core of Neoliberal welfare ideals (Jenson, 2012, p. 71). 
Instead, trust is put in the market’s ability to cater to the population’s needs. The 
author suggests the principal goal of a Neoliberal welfare state to be to foster 
independent citizens. This involves assigning substantial responsibility to the 
individual and her family. Further, inequality is viewed as a necessary part of 
market economies (Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73). Jenson argues the Neoliberal 
perspective to view ‘lack of market income as private matters’ and strive to 
restrain all forms of income transfers (Jenson, 2012, p. 73).  
It is every citizen’s duty to have a job in order to secure her own wellbeing. 
Jenson claims Neoliberal welfare to be a form of ‘workfare’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 73). 
To be granted any of the (limited) citizenship rights, the individual must first and 
foremost have a job and ‘any job is [considered] a good job’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 73). 
Women and young people should participate in the labor market only if they can 
afford to do so. Accordingly, the young part of the population is expected to stay 
within the education system until they are financially independent individuals 
(Jenson, 2012, p. 72).  
The American political scientist Duane Swank specifies the individual’s duty 
to provide for herself. According to the Neoliberal ideal, income replacement 
should be especially limited (in a system where social service expenditure should 
be restricted overall). Instead, labor market insecurity should be dealt with by the 
individual herself (Swank, 2014, p. 176). Besides restricted income replacement, 
this also involves limited rights of the workers and, hence, limited responsibilities 
for the employers. In general, the Neoliberal state should facilitate matching 
between labor market actors (for example by keeping minimum wages low and 
possible to negotiate) (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 41, 43; Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 
256, 267).  
4.2.2 Access and governance in Neoliberal welfare 
Jenson considers ideal Neoliberal welfare as based on wide-ranged privatizations. 
Where privatization is not possible, the public sector should be run like private 
corporations. According to Jenson, the Neoliberal privatization ideal views 
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increased economic efficiency as a success factor. The lower the cost for the 
service the better (Jenson, 2012, p. 75-76). Further, Jenson argues that 
privatization is promoted ‘in the name of ‘choice’’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 76). The 
Neoliberal ideal considers the ability to personally select social service provider 
as an important aspect of the citizens’ autonomy. This, since citizens are regarded 
as ‘experts’ on their own needs and desires (Jenson, 2012, p. 76).   
Concerning societal representation, Jenson argues Neoliberal ideals to 
advocate representation of ‘’individuals’ and not groups’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 77). 
Accordingly, the ideal discourages issue-organizations (Jenson, 2012, p. 77).  
Swank clarifies the Neoliberal ideal’s view on access to social services. The 
author explains that eligibility for social services should be considerably restricted 
and that – once an individual has been granted social services – she (as a service 
user) should go-pay (Swank, 2014, p. 176). Consequently, social services should 
be targeted to (limited) specific needs, as well as provided on a means-tested basis 
(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 41, 43; Swank, 2014, p. 176).  
Newman et al. make an important contribution related to the relationship 
between the service user and the service provider. In the spirit of the Neoliberal 
ideal, the welfare service user should be in control of her situation and thus have 
the power to choose service provider (Newman et al., 2014, p. 370). Privatizations 
are regarded the key to such supremacy of the individual (Hemerijck, 2014, p. 40-
41, 43).  
4.2.3 The responsibility mix in Neoliberal welfare  
The state’s responsibility is considerably limited in Neoliberal welfare. Instead, 
Jenson’s analysis suggests that the Neoliberal market ‘[s]hould provide wellbeing 
for all’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 68). Thus, the individual is assigned substantial 
responsibility to make sure that the market supports her and her family. Jenson 
claims delimiting the role of the state to be a way to avoid ‘creat[ing] the risk of 
[state] dependency’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 68). The author suggests that restricting 
entitlement to social services and promoting labor market entrance are means by 
the state to circumvent such dependence (Jenson, 2012, p. 69). In sum, Jenson 
claims Neoliberal welfare to consider ‘social spending and state intervention [as] 
in conflict with economic prosperity’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 68).  
Hemerijck pinpoints the responsibility of the Neoliberal state by suggesting 
that this state’s primary functions should be to ensure that the citizens do not 
violate each other’s’ rights. Social services should be outsourced or contracted out 
(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 40-41, 43; Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 259). This idea is 
substantiated by the German political scientist Claus Offe’s argumentation that the 
conceptual lens of Neoliberalism regards social spending as a hinder of economic 
growth. This, as social spending discourages both investments and paid 
employment (work) (Offe, 2014, p. 62, 65).  
Hemerijck makes another important contribution to the conceptual lens of 
Neoliberal welfare ideals. Supposedly, the economy is herein managed through 
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supply-oriented means. This involves, for example, having an independent central 
bank and keeping inflation to a minimum (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 40-41).  
 
4.3 The conceptual lens of Social Investment welfare 
ideals  
In some sense, this thesis regards Social Investment welfare ideals as a 
compromise between the Keynesian and the Neoliberal ideals. Yet, the conceptual 
lens of Social Investment does not merely represent a mixture in content of the 
two previously presented lenses. Instead, this thesis argues that the core 
suggestions of Social Investment welfare ideals are distinct enough to constitute a 
separate (parallel) conceptual lens. Concisely, Social Investment ideals are herein 
regarded as future- and multipurpose-centric. 
4.3.1 Rights and duties in Social Investment welfare  
Jenson suggests that ‘human capital’ is the catchword of the Social Investment 
welfare ideal (Jenson, 2012, p. 72). The population ‘have a duty as citizens to 
invest in their human capital by seeking education and training’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 
73). According to Jenson, Social Investment welfare is significantly concerned 
with urging the population to protect themselves from potential future misfortune. 
Thus, the state encourages the citizens to invest in their human capital as well as 
to privately save considerable amounts of money (Jenson, 2012, p. 72-73). Jenson 
claims Social Investment equality to mean ‘[e]quality of opportunity’ (Jenson, 
2012, p. 72). To ensure such equality, investment in human capital should start 
already in preschool. In addition, the Social Investment ideal considers learning as 
a life-long possibility. Jenson proposes that the Social Investment state therefore 
promotes higher education for all (Jenson, 2012, p. 72-73).  
Further, the author suggests that the Social Investment welfare ideal allows 
some state interference. The Social Investment state should offer support ‘when 
the market fails to provide the service at an affordable price’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 
72). Jenson claims that such support is primarily directed towards poor families 
with children (Jenson, 2012, p. 73).  
De Deken makes an important note on the support from the state. Looking 
through the conceptual lens of Social Investment welfare ideals, for social 
equality and economic efficiency to be compatible, benefits must be provided 
only on a short-term basis (De Deken, 2014, p. 260, 266).  
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4.3.2 Access and governance in Social Investment welfare  
Regarding the structure of the welfare system, Jenson suggests that ‘[t]he design 
of governance arrangements [in Social Investment welfare] relies extensively on 
notions of consultation, communication and local involvement’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 
77). The primary role of the state is to invest in the citizens’ potential to be 
productive. According to Jenson, the Social Investment ideal considers improving 
individual capacities beneficial not only to the individual herself. Instead, the 
ideal means that improved individual capacities jointly create an improved 
common society (Jenson, 2012, p. 75, 77).  
To best create high individual and collective productivity, Jenson argues the 
Social Investment welfare ideal to advocate ‘[n]etworking and partnerships’ 
(Jenson, 2012, p. 75).  Hence, the ideal encourages none-governmental issue-
organizations. Further, the author suggests that success is measured in the quality 
of outcomes (Jenson, 2012, p. 75, 77).  
4.3.3 The responsibility mix in Social Investment welfare  
In Social Investment welfare, the citizens and the state share responsibility for the 
population’s wellbeing. Jenson suggests that such responsibility is taken through 
investments. The conceptual lens regards expenditures today as investments in the 
future. The citizens are obliged to invest in their own human capital as well as 
save for future expenses. Jenson proposes the Social Investment ideal to thereby 
(partly) replace social service expenditures with private savings (Jenson, 2012, p. 
68-69). The author describes that ‘via savings [the citizens are supposed to care] 
for their retirement pensions and their children’s’ education’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 
69).  
Despite substantial individual responsibility, Jenson argues that the Social 
Investment ideal also assigns the state some welfare responsibilities. The state’s 
primary function is to protect the citizens when the market fails to do so. This 
involves combating child and working poverty, as well as facilitating balancing 
work and family lives (Jenson, 2012, p. 68-69). Finally, the author describes how 
the sharing of responsibilities (between the state and the individual) springs from 
the Social Investment perspective taking ‘new’ social risks into account (Jenson, 
2012, p. 63). Contemporary demographic and economic circumstances have 
provoked these new risks, including, for example, female career opportunities and 
adjustments to a post-industrial society (Jenson, 2012, p. 69). 
Hemerijck adds to this list of issues which the Social Investment state is 
obliged to attend to. These new social risks involve, for example, attending to 
long term unemployed, single parenthood, immigration etc. Moreover, the state 
should attend to skills being obsolete but the individual herself also has de duty to 
invest in her human capital (De Deken, 2014, p. 266; Hemerijck, 2012, p. 47-48, 
51-52).  
An important attribute of the Social Investment state – that welfare should be 
enabling – is brought up by the Belgian sociologist Bea Cantillon. Accordingly, 
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the state should attend to the ability for the individual to balance work and leisure 
(Cantillion, 2011, p. 437, 439). Importantly, here social services aim to break the 
cycle of intergenerational poverty. Caring for children and young people is 
important as they constitute tomorrow’s society. Concisely, social spending is 
regarded as investment in the future. However, the lifelong perspective should not 
only be taken on by the state. Instead, it should be profitable for citizens to 
transfer their own money over the life course (compared to consuming all in the 
present) (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46-48, 51-54).  
Finally, the Social Investment state is (like the Neoliberal) managed through 
supply-oriented means. For this conceptual lens, this involves creating productive 
future taxpayers. Human capital improvements are key. In a sequential 
perspective, the Social Investment ideal proposes that human capital is tightly 
linked to employment. Thereby advanced education level creates both higher 
individual income and tax revenue. In turn, the higher income and tax revenues 
help improve general economic growth (De Deken, 2014, p. 262; Hemerijck, 
2012, p. 51, 53).   
4.4 Concluding remark on Keynesian, Neoliberal and 
Social Investment welfare ideals 
The alert reader might have observed that the content of the Social Investment 
ideals appears to coincide twice with the implications of the other conceptual 
lenses. First, the passages above explain that the Neoliberal and Social Investment 
ideals both advocate the economy being managed through supply-oriented means. 
Second, the presentation suggest that both the Keynesian and Social Investment 
ideals consider issue organizations (associations) desirable. An overlap of 
contents, between the three conceptual lenses, would violate a core premise of the 
later conducted ideal type analysis; that the artificial ideal types most be mutually 
exclusive (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 143-144). However, the herein perceived 
overlap is nothing but a chimaera.  
For Neoliberalism, the supply-oriented means of the economy strictly involve 
controlling inflation, keeping the currency stable and the central bank 
independent. In contrast, for Social Investment ideals, supply-oriented means 
involves enhancing individual and common productivity to increase (future) tax 
revenues (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 40-41, 51). In regards of issue organizations, the 
conceptual lens of Keynesianism includes only labor unions or issue-
organizations with explicit, specific economic interests (Schierup & Castles, 2014, 
p. 255). In opposite, the issue-organizations of the Social Investment ideal involve 
local associations that embody more than just one, narrowly defined, economic 
interest (Jenson, 2012, p. 77). Thus, the contents of the conceptual lenses are still 
utterly distinct. 
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A. Core elements of Keynesianism
A1. The state should protect the citizens
A1.1 The state should ensure social justice/equity
A1.2 Social services are universal rights 
A1.3 Social services aim to enhance equality
A1.4 Social services aim to protect/secure the population
A1.5 Social services are compensatory/provided retroactively
A1.6 Social services should focus on especially important issues/risks 
A1.7 Social services are improved through higher spending/input
A2. The state should act as an economic stabilizer
A2.1 The state should govern through an extensive bureaucratic apparatus
A2.2 The state should balance economy cycles/act countercyclically
A2.3 The economy is managed through consumption/demand-oriented means
A2.4 Consumption of social services takes place in the present 
A3. The state should reduce the citizens' (financial) dependence on the labor market
A3.1 The state should reduce labor market insecurity
A3.2 The state should ensure full (male) employment 
A3.3 Issue-organizations/associations are desirable 
A3.4 Citizens should complete mandatory education
4.5 Tailored analytical framework 
From the suggestion in previous passages, this thesis has modeled a unique 
analytical tool. The tool is comprehensive and serves as a tailored means to 
answer how developments in SAP welfare ideology, over the past 70 years can be 
understood, using the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social 
Investment welfare ideals. This tailor-made tool (or analytical framework) 
represents this thesis’s prime seminal contribution to the field of political science. 
Table 2, 3 and 4 provides an abbreviation of this tool. The analytical framework in 
its entirety, is included in Appendix 9.3 and 9.4.  
To module the analytical framework, this thesis has transformed the 
previously presented running text to explicit statements (or bullet points). The 
statements included in table 2, 3 and 4 encompass Jenson’s suggestions on rights 
and duties, access and governance, and the responsibility mix in Keynesian, 
Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals. However, the statements are 
structured in accordance with what this thesis regards as most important for the 
three welfare ideals.  In the analytical framework, A represents Keynesianism, B 
represents Neoliberalism and C represents Social Investment welfare ideals.  
 
 
Table 2 – Core elements of Keynesianism (A) 
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B. Core elements of Neoliberalism
B1. The welfare sector is a burden 
B1.1 The state's primary function should be to ensure that citizens do not violate each other's rights
B1.2 The state should support only the poorest citizens 
B1.3 Social service expenditures should be restricted 
B1.4 Social spending hinders economic growth 
B1.5 Social services cause (undesired) state-dependent citizens
B1.6 Social services are improved through higher efficiency/lower costs per service
B2. The market sector is the solution
B2.1 Social equality/equity and economic efficiency are incompatible
B2.2 Social services should be privatized/provided by the market
B2.3 The economy is managed through supply-oriented means
B3. The citizens should be independent and in control
B3.1 The citizens should be self-reliant
B4. The labor market should be deregulated 
B4.1 Labor market insecurity should be dealt with by the individual herself 
B4.2 The state should facilitate matching between labor market actors 
B4.3 Unemployment compensation should be limited
B4.4 Everybody who is able to should work
B4.5 Issue-organizations/associations are undesirable
B4.6 Citizens are encouraged to attain tertiary education in order to achieve financial independence
The core elements of Keynesianism are structured around three prominent 
categories of statements (A1, A2 and A3). Mainly, the statements in group A1 
(The state should protect the citizens) correspond to Jenson’s idea on rights and 
duties, and the responsibility mix. Here, the citizens are granted a multitude of 
rights and the state has extensive responsibilities for the population’s wellbeing. 
Accordingly, the state is the most important actor in the Keynesian responsibility 
mix.  
The statements in group A2 (The state should act as an economic stabilizer) 
relates mainly to the view on access and governance and the responsibility mix. 
Again, the state is assigned considerable responsibility. This time to balance 
economic cycles. Further, governance of welfare services should take place 
through an extensive state apparatus.  
Finally, the statements in group A3 (The state should reduce the citizens’ 
(financial) dependence in the labor market) relates mainly to Jenson’s rights and 
duties, as the statements here signal how the state is obliged to attend to the labor 
workers’ rights.  
 
 
Table 3 – Core elements of Neoliberalism (B) 
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C. Core elements of Social Investment
C1. The state should support citizens when the market fails to do so
C1.1 The market should handle old social risks/issues
C1.2 The state should handle new social risks/issues
C2. Social services aim to prevent citizens from needing state support
C2.1  Social equality/equity and economic efficiency are compatible
C2.2 The welfare state should be enabling 
C2.3 The welfare state should be future-oriented 
C2.4 The welfare state should encourage the citizens to take on a lifelong perspective
C2.5 The welfare sector should consist of partnerships and networks
C2.6 Social services are improved through higher productivity capacity/better outcomes 
C3. Education/human capital is central for wellbeing 
C3.1 Citizens have the duty to invest in their human capital
C3.2 Human capital improvements create economic growth
C3.3 The economy is managed through supply-oriented means
C3.4 Issue-organizations/associations are desirable 
Table 3 shows that the elements of Neoliberalism are structured around four 
prominent categories of statements (B1, B2, B3 and B4). The statements in group 
B1 (The welfare sector is a burden), relates to all aspects of Jenson’s analysis. In 
regards of rights and duties, the statements suggest that the citizens are granted 
only minimum rights and the state is thus assigned minimum responsibility for the 
citizens’ wellbeing. This also relates to Jenson’s responsibility mix. Considering 
the access and governance, the statements of this group signal that access to social 
services is restricted.  
The statements in group B2 (The market sector is the solution), has clear 
connection to Jenson’s view on access and governance, as the statements in this 
group signal that the market should be the service provider. Further, group B3 
(The citizens should be independent and in control), explicitly communicates the 
individual’s prominent role in the responsibility mix in welfare ideals.  
Finally, the statements in group B4 (The labor market should be deregulated), 
relates mainly to Jenson’s ide of rights and duties. The statements of this group 
illustrate that, here, workers’ rights are significantly restricted.  
 
 
Table 4 – Core elements of Social Investment (C) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, table 4 shows that the elements of Social Investment welfare ideals are 
structured around three prominent categories of statements (C1, C2 and C3). The 
statements in group C1 (The state should support the citizens when the market 
fails to do so), mainly relates to Jenson’s idea on rights and duties, and the 
responsibility mix in welfare ideals. This group of statements signals that the 
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individual is granted rights in relation to some issues (see discussion above on 
old- and new social risks). Moreover, the statements of this group signal that the 
state and the market share responsibility for the citizens’ wellbeing.  
The statements in group C2 (Social services aim to prevent citizens from 
needing state support), in essence relates to all aspects of Jenson’s analysis. 
Importantly, the emphasis on partnerships and networks (statement C2.5) is 
especially related to how the welfare system should be administered, i.e. related to 
the idea of access and governance.  
At last, the statements in group C3 (Education/human capital is central for 
wellbeing) are related mainly to the aspects of rights and duties, and the 
responsibility mix in welfare ideals. Accordingly, the statements of this group 
signal that the individual is obliged to invest in her human capital. Further, the 
statements also suggest that the individual – in addition to the state and the market 
– also has significant responsibility for her own wellbeing.  
4.6 How to go from here? 
Hitherto, this thesis has reviewed the research field, postulated the research 
question, laid out the relevant theoretical framework and described how a tailor-
made analytical tool has been derived from the broader theoretical implications. 
The upcoming section (on material and method) elaborates on how to observe 
these ideas, in SAP’s ideological developments from the Second World War until 
today. Crucially, the logic behind the next section involves two important 
expectations. The literature provides reason to expect (1) change in balance of 
welfare ideals over time. This is herein referred to as inter ideal type 
developments. However, the literature also motivates expecting (2) change in 
balance of the welfare ideals’ core elements (i.e. A1, A2, A3, B1, B2 etc.). This is 
herein referred to as intra ideal type developments. The expectations of both inter 
and intra ideal type developments are of importance to the following presentation 
on this thesis’s numerical content analysis.  
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5 Material and method 
This section explains the logic of this thesis’s choice of research material and 
method. It starts by presenting the selected material and continues by explaining 
the methodological foundations in detail. Last, it comments on the shortcomings 
associated with the chosen procedure. To start with, however, the ontological and 
epistemological premises of the thesis shall be clarified.  
5.1 Ontological and epistemological stance 
Regarding the character of reality and the comprehensibility of such reality, this 
thesis joins a positivistic approach (as defined by Badersten & Gustavsson, 2010, 
p. 40-43). Put more specifically, it embraces ‘an ontological assumption that there 
is a reality which is independent of our subjective consciousnesses [as well as] an 
epistemological assumption that it through systematic observations is possible to 
attain legitimate knowledge of this reality’ [my translation] (Esaiasson et al., 
2012, p. 19). These premises constitute the basis for the subsequent reasoning 
about selected research material and method.  
5.2 Material 
As this thesis focuses on The Swedish Social Democratic Party, SAP election 
manifestos have been chosen as research material. Election manifestos are 
characterized by including a number of political goals which the party wishes to 
fulfill during upcoming mandate period. Thus, political parties are the remitters 
and the citizens of an electoral district (in this case the Swedish population) 
constitute the recipient (Swedish Labor Movement’s Archives and Library, 2014; 
The Manifesto Project).  
During the time period addressed in this thesis, SAP published 21 election 
manifestos7 (Swedish Labor Movement’s Archives and Library, 2014). To 
maximize the accuracy of the project, this thesis applies a total selection, 
including all 21 documents. In general, the 21 election manifestoes published by 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 The manifestos were published in 1948, 1952, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1964, 1968, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 
1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 (Swedish Labor Movement’s Archives and Library, 
2014). 
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SAP between 1948 and 20148 constitute appropriate research material for four 
reasons. First, the manifestos aim to communicate precisely (what is herein 
defined as) political ideology. Second, the manifestos present a unitary stance for 
SAP as a whole (not statements from particular individuals or local partisan 
subgroups). Third, the manifestos address the public and hence present the 
political ideology officially communicated to the electorate. Fourth, the 
publication frequency of the election manifestos allows this thesis to catch short-
term fluctuations as well as long-term developments of SAP welfare ideology.  
In the same period SAP – of course – produced various other political works, 
which potentially could have been examined herein. These include for example 
parliamentary debates, budgets and budget propositions, suggested and 
implemented policies etc. However, such material is excluded from current study 
as this thesis focuses solely on ideological advocacy preached in the run-up for 
national elections. Information given in the alternative resources listed above are 
instead suggested to mainly give information about actions taken by parties when 
holding office or being in opposition (i.e. after the election process). Further, the 
alternative resources are produced to inform other parties and politicians 
internally. This means that the content and presentation might differ from the one 
given to the public, thereby falling outside the scope of this thesis.   
SAP party programs are also left out. This decision might seem more 
conspicuous. Party programs serve principally the same purpose as election 
manifestos, yet these documents are not included in current thesis. The decision to 
exclude party programs rets on two pillars. First, only four9 programs, with 
considerable temporal distance, were published during the period (Swedish Labor 
Movement’s Archives and Library, 2011). This circumstance undermines the 
possibility to see short term developments. Second, the party programs generally 
differ by only minor adjustments. This rigidity aggravates the ability to examine 
temporal ideological developments at all.  
In sum, the 21 election manifestos published between 1948 and 2014 serve as 
the most appropriate research material given the purpose of this thesis.  
5.3 Choosing textual content analysis 
Herein, textual content analysis was used as the foundational method. To structure 
the content analysis, the thesis used ideal types as means of categorizing what was 
found in the 21 election manifestos. An ideal type stipulates a refined imaginary 
construction of the addressed phenomenon. It serves as an analytical grid to apply 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8 No manifestos were published between 1945 and 1948, nor have any (yet) been published after 2014. Thus, 
studying the manifestos published by SAP between 1948 and 2014 equals studying the manifestos for the time 
period addressed in this thesis (i.e. 1945 until today).  
9 The programs were published in 1944, 1960, 1975, 1990 and 2001 (Swedish Labor Movement’s Archives and 
Library, 2011).  
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to the material to examine how reality corresponds to the fictive construction 
(Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 139-141, 197; Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 63, 150). 
To seek SAP developments in ideological emphasis, a temporal comparison of the 
results was carried out. 
The content analysis rested on two pillars. One part of the thesis consisted in 
generating descriptive statistics from the 21 election manifestos. For this purpose, 
numerical content analysis was used. Such analysis allows processing extensive 
material to examine the occurrence of various political stances (Bergström & 
Boréus, 2012, p. 58-59, 63¸ Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 50, 197-198). Numerical 
content analysis is a generally accepted method when studying the content of 
political writings such as election manifestos. This as the analysis is exceptionally 
suitable for carrying out temporal comparison of the character and scope given to 
certain – explicitly communicated – stances (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 50-51, 
53, 59, 87; Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 198-199). 
A second pillar of this thesis consisted of comparing the results to the 
sequential theoretical implications of three waves of welfare state developments. 
Furthermore, by examining the relative emphasis within each welfare ideology 
(i.e. ideal type), this study also involved entering an unexplored field. The results 
of this thesis contribute to understanding – hitherto sparingly studied – internal 
developments in Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals. In 
addition to the descriptive approach presented, the thesis thus also holds an 
exploratory approach. 
5.4 Applying textual content analysis 
Ideal type Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare were modeled 
from the conceptual lenses presented above. The three ideal types are mutually 
exclusive. Thus, they present distinguishing features for each utterly distinct 
welfare ideology containing parallel approaches on how to coordinate state, 
individual and market (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 143-144). The thesis used various 
scholars’ preexisting suggestions when modelling the three ideal types. Thereby, 
the thesis constructed comprehensive, detailed, analytical grids for Keynesian, 
Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals by synchronizing several 
complementary ideas. 
The three ideal types were used to perform a systematic temporal comparison. 
Each of the 21 election manifestos was analyzed through the same lenses of 
Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals, respectively. This 
procedure allows an efficient assessment of an extensive material, using time as a 
point of reference to identify potential change (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 146; 
Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 166-167). It is thereby a suitable methodological 
onset for this thesis as the paper seeks to examine long term patterns in SAP 
ideological developments.  
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5.4.1 Code scheme of operational indicators  
 
First, the ideal types were operationalized by listing a number of indicators which 
are presented in a code scheme, including in total 133 indicators10. The indicators 
were adjusted to suit this thesis’s definition of welfare ideology. Therefore, the 
indicators focus on identifying (1) judgements of reality, (2) formulations of goals 
and demands, and (3) means to achieve these. For a linguistical fit between the 
body text presentation of the ideal types and the code scheme, words such as 
is/are, aim/aims and should are frequently reoccurring among the indicators. 
Furthermore, to enhance the cohesion between the SAP election manifestos 
(which are published in Swedish) the code scheme was translated into Swedish.   
The code scheme presents the indicators listed in code scheme subgroups. 
This, in order to be able to examine not only SAP’s relative support between the 
ideal types but also what is especially stressed within each ideal type. A taste of 
this tailor-made framework has been presented (see table 2, 3 and 4). For the code 
schemes in their entirety (both English and Swedish), consult Appendices 9.3 and 
9.4. The subgroups represent prominent issues, unique for each ideal type. The 
reader shall be aware that the ideal types are mutually exclusive and formulated to 
cover the same aspects for each ideal type respectively, but that the code scheme 
indicators are organized differently depending on ideal type. The subgroups 
involve up to three levels of precision among the indicators. The logic is clarified 
with an example using parts of the Keynesian code scheme indicators, see figure 
2.  
 
Figure 2 – Example of code scheme subgroup levels 
 
 
Figure 2 displays an excerpt of the second subgroup of Keynesian indicators 
called ‘A2. The state should act as an economic stabilizer’. A2 is a first level 
indicator. Further, ‘A2.1 The state should govern through an extensive 
bureaucratic apparatus’ is a more precise category within subgroup A2. Thus, 
A2.1 is a second level indicator. Finally, ‘A2.1.1 The state should have wide-
ranging authorities’ is an even more precise category within subgroup A2. 
Therefore, A2.1.1 is a third level indicator. Separating the code scheme indicators 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10 Each ideal type includes approximately the same number of indicators. Keynesianism involve 42, 
Neoliberalism involve 46 and Social Investment involve 45. Hence, no ideal type is favored by the code scheme. 
Instead the scheme allows equal possibilities to identify ideas supporting each category.  
  38 
in three levels allows a delicate analysis of potential temporal variation within 
each ideal type.  
The 21 election manifestos were then coded manually. The manual coding 
facilitates examination of subtle and complex statements made by the SAP, which 
might have been lost in an automatic analysis using computer software 
(Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 51). Every sentence in the manifestos was 
examined and could involve one, several or no indicators. Whenever an indicator 
was identified, it was noted in a scoreboard11. As the ideal types are mutually 
exclusive, a specific statement could only manifest one ideal type. The scoreboard 
kept separate track of indicators found (1) in each manifesto/year, (2) for each 
ideal type and (3) for subgroups in each ideal type. Accordingly, the aggregate 
number of indicators for each manifesto/year, ideal type and ideal type subgroup 
was calculated and displayed in the scoreboard. 
Figure 3 provides an example of where indicators were found in election 
manifestos and how these were classified. The figure shows how three separate 
statements about improvement were classified as belonging to different ideal 
types. (Appendix 9.5 provides a more detailed coding example by presenting the 
coding of the 2010 election manifesto at length.) 
 
Figure 3 – Example of code scheme indicator identification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 The scoreboard is not included herein but available upon request.  
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5.4.2 Statistical analysis of inter and intra ideal type developments  
 
The next step of the numerical content analysis, involved generating descriptive 
statistics. The statistics were generated by a number of equations. Equation 1, 2 
and 3 examine inter ideal type developments (i.e. change in balance of welfare 
ideals). Equation 4 and 5 examine intra ideal type developments (i.e. change in 
balance of the welfare ideals’ core elements – hence breaking down the analysis 
to first level ideal type subgroups).  
In order to examine SAP’s ideological dynamics, trough the conceptual lenses 
of Keynesianism, Neoliberalism and Social Investment welfare, the developments 
of relative weight between the three ideal types was calculated using the following 
equation:  
 
Equation 1 – Relative weight between ideal types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results section of this thesis presents the findings of relative weight in a line 
chart and a table. In accordance with equation 1, the lines presented for each 
manifesto/year together add up to 100 percent.  
To be able to examine SAP’s ideological stability over time, the standard 
deviation of the allotment of code scheme indicators was calculated for each ideal 
type, using the following equation:  
 
 
Equation 2 – Standard deviation of relative weight of ideal types  
 
 
To study periodical prominence of the various ideal types, the mean values of the 
relative ideal type weights were calculated. The mean values for each wave of 
welfare state developments were calculated respectively, using the following 
equation:  
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Equation 3 – Mean value for the ideal types’ proportion within the waves of welfare state development 
 
 
 
To examine which aspects of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment 
welfare SAP stresses, the relative weight between the ideal type subgroups was 
calculated using the following equation:  
 
 
Equation 4 – Relative weight between ideal type subgroups 
 
 
The result section of this thesis presents the findings of relative weight among 
subgroups in tables. In accordance with equation 4, each table adds up to 100 
percent for each ideal type each year. Equation 4 only includes first level 
subgroups. This, to enhance the possibility to make broader generalizations of the 
results and avoid a muddy analysis, excessively sensitive to minor ideological 
deviations.  
To estimate the prominence of specific ideal type subgroups overall, the mean 
values for the relative subgroups weights were calculated. The mean values for 
the entire time period studied were calculated using the following equation: 
 
 
Equation 5 – Mean values for first level code scheme indicator subgroups 
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5.4.3 Validity and reliability  
 
It is particularly crucial to achieve high validity – i.e. correspondence between 
what the study aims to measure and what is actually measured – in an ideal type 
analysis (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 57; Kvist, 2007, p. 477). The validity of this 
thesis is highly dependent on the code scheme’s subtlety. There for – to optimize 
the thesis’s validity – the code scheme was formulated in harmony with the 
generally accepted language used in the research field. Furthermore, the research 
material was carefully chosen to synchronize with the postulated ideal types. 
Consideration has thus been taken to the coherence of what SAP communicates 
through the election manifestos and what the ideal type analysis aims to capture 
(Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 82; Lile, 2017, p. 38-40).  
Manual coding may be regarded as potentially problematic in terms of its 
reliability – i.e. consistency in measurement – compared to automatic coding 
using computer software (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 57). To reduce the likelihood 
of human error, all material was coded twice. Wherever discrepancies appeared 
between the first and second coding, the author of this thesis carefully considered 
how the particular statement should be classified or if it should be left out. This 
consideration has been done by consulting the coding of similar statements in the 
manifestos. Thus, in times of ambiguity, codings of other parts of the texts have 
served as guidelines for how to categorize certain statements. Finally, figure 4 
shows the length of the manifestos and figure 5 shows the total number of code 
scheme indicators found in the same manifestos.  
 
 
Figure 4 – Length of election manifestos  
 (Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014) 
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Figure 5 – Number of indicators found in election manifestos 
 (Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014) 
 
 
 
These figures show that the number of words and number of code scheme 
indicators of each manifesto are connected. If the documents are expected to be 
(approximately) equally dense with ideological statements, figure 4 and 5 together 
imply that the manual coding of this thesis has been done with high consistency, 
thereby fulfilling the standards for high reliability.  
5.4.4 Methodological shortcomings 
Some opponents might question the suitability of quantitative method within the 
field of political science – the things that count cannot be counted. However, this 
thesis aligns with King et al. in the belief that quantitative research has an 
important place in social science (King et al., 1999, p. 4-6). Here, the numerical 
content analysis allows a temporal scope which would have been difficult to 
match if performing qualitative research. Accordingly, this thesis provides 
exceptionally comprehensive results on SAP’s welfare ideological developments. 
Furthermore, the lucid code schemes enable an analysis with close attention to 
detail – despite the extensive temporal scope. Consequently, this thesis does not 
regard the qualitative method as a shortcoming, but as an advantage.  
Some might also be critical to this thesis’s emphasis on description. In contrast 
to such criticism, this thesis considers descriptive research as essential to political 
science. Descriptions are valuable both in and of themselves, and as a foundation 
for further explanation (Esaiasson et al., 2017, p. 160; King et al., 1999, p. 34).  
A significant part of this thesis is dedicated to, in detail, describing the work 
of others. This might signal that too lite attention is given to the original research 
performed herein. Accordingly, the thesis might not seem independent but appear 
as a summary of previous scholars’ work. However, the close attention to others’ 
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work is a necessary part of this thesis’s construction of its ideal type analysis. 
Therefore, the reader should not regard the extensive presentation of preexisting 
literature as superfluous or irrelevant. Instead, is should be considered as an 
important element of this thesis’s independent research.  
Finally, there are a number of shortcomings associated with ideal type 
analysis. Firstly, beforehand deciding which ideal types that should be exclusively 
included in the thesis means that the study is unable to capture other perspectives. 
Secondly and relatedly, if the accordance between the formulated ideal types and 
the information communicated in the material is poor, the study might suffer 
considerable validity problems (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 167). However, 
these issues are merely tangential and may be addressed through close attention to 
detail.  The correspondence between the kind of information communicated in the 
election manifestos and the kind of information sought to be captured in the 
thesis’s three ideal types, is regarded high enough to carry out a fruitful analysis.  
Furthermore, the ideal type analysis leaves little flexibility to the later 
discussion of the results. A major part of the analysis has already been done when 
modeling the ideal types. Consequently, the subsequent results’ discussion might 
appear jejune. To appreciate the contribution of this thesis, the reader should 
therefore pay close attention to the modeling of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social 
Investment welfare ideals. 
Lastly, ideal type analyses involve the risk of restricting intersubjectivity. The 
study is considerably dependent on the researcher’s judgement (Esaiasson et al., 
2012, p. 144; Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 169). This thesis moderates such 
difficulties by making the research process transparent and consistent. In sum, the 
passages on research method and appendices 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 are considered 
precise enough to avoid the researcher’s subjective judgement gravely 
undermining the cogency of the thesis’s results.  
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6 Results 
This section presents the findings from the textual content analysis according to 
the classification of ideal types. First, the section compares and contrasts the 
results of the three ideal types; i.e. inter ideal type developments. Thereafter, the 
passage discusses the findings for internal developments within each welfare 
ideology – hence breaking down the analysis to first level ideal type subgroups; 
i.e. intra ideal type developments.   
6.1 Inter ideal type developments  
The overall findings are summarized in figure 6. The graph displays the relative 
salience of the three ideal types over the entire time period studied. (Figure 6 is 
constructed using equation 1). The relative salience tells how SAP balanced the 
state- and equality-centric, the market- and autonomy-centric, and the future- and 
multipurpose-centric ideals, at each point in time.  
 
 
Figure 6 – Ideal type proportions 
(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014) 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates three main findings. First, the proportion of Keynesian 
indicators is higher than the two others in all election manifestos. Second, 
Neoliberal indicators are the least prominent in all documents. Third, between 
1948 and 1976/1979 the proportion of Keynesian indicators and Social Investment 
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indicators exist in and (almost) inverse relation. When the proportion of 
Keynesian indicators rises the proportion of Social Investment indicators declines, 
and vice versa. Since 1976/1979 however, the Social Investment proportion seems 
to rise steadily. Instead, since 1976/1979, the Keynesian proportion rises when the 
Neoliberal declines and vice versa.   
Table 5 presents the precise proportion of ideal type indicators. Hence, it 
clarifies SAP’s balancing act between the state-, market-, and future-centric 
ideals. Both table 5 and figure 6, show that the proportion of Keynesian indicators 
peaked in 1958, accounting for 93% of the total indicators. By contrast, the 
proportion of Keynesian indicators reached its lowest point in 1948, then 
accounting for only 47%. The proportion of Neoliberal indicators, on the other 
hand, peaked in 1994 with a proportion of 23% of the total number of indicators. 
However, in 1958, 1960, 1973 and 1976 the proportions of Neoliberal indicators 
were all zero percent. Finally, the proportion of Social Investment indicators 
peaked at 42%, in 1964 and had its lowest proportion of 7% in 1958.  
 
 
Table 5 – Ideal type proportions by year 
 (Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014) 
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Comparing the peaks and valleys, figure 6 shows that the proportion of Keynesian 
indicators differs the most over time. The difference between highest and lowest 
proportion for these indicators is 46 percentage points. The proportion of 
Neoliberal indicators differs the least, spanning only 23 percentage points. The 
proportion of Social Investment indicators once again appears in between, as this 
proportion spans 35 percentage points.  
The spread in ideal type proportion can also be illustrated by presenting the 
standard deviation of indicators allotment for each ideal type. The standard 
deviation tells how stable SAP has been in their emphasis on the state- and 
equality-centric, the market- and autonomy-centric, and the future- and 
multipurpose-centric ideals, respectively. Table 6 shows that the allotment of 
Keynesian indicators has a standard deviation of 0,13, which is the highest value 
among all ideal types. The allotment of Neoliberal indicators has the lowest 
standard deviation of 0,07 and Social Investment indicators have a standard 
deviation of 0,1.  
 
 
Table 6 – Variation and standard deviation of ideal type proportions 
 (Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014) 
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By presenting the variation from the mean value for each observation (i.e. SAP 
election manifestos), table 6 shows which years fall outside of the standard 
deviation for indicator allotment of each ideal type. (Table 6 is constructed using 
equation 1 and 2). There are seven12 observations in which the proportion of 
Keynesian indicators fall outside the standard deviation range. For Neoliberalism, 
the proportion also falls outside in seven13 observations, and for Social Investment 
the proportion falls outside the standard deviation range in five14 observations.  
It is significant that in the year of 1958 and 1973, the observations for all ideal 
type indicators fall outside the standard deviation range. This might mean that the 
manifestos of 1958 and 1973 are particularly different in the allocation of ideal 
type indicators (meaning that SAP’s relative weight between Keynesianism, 
Neoliberalism and Social Investment is especially anomalous these years). 
Looking closer at these years, table 5 shows that in 1958 Keynesian indicators 
held 93% of all indicators. The same year, Neoliberal indicators accounted for 
zero percent and Social Investment indicators accounted for 7% of the total 
number of indicators found in the election manifesto. In 1973, the Keynesian 
proportion was 92%, the Neoliberal proportion was again zero percent, and the 
Social Investment proportion was 8%. Thus, in 1958 and 1973 Keynesian 
indicators reached their highest proportion and both Neoliberalism and Social 
Investment indicators had their lowest quotas.  
Finally, table 7 shows the mean values for the percentages of indicators for the 
three ideal types, separated according to the presumed waves of welfare state 
developments (table 7 is constructed using equation 315). Here, the mean values 
give an idea of how SAP generally balanced the state- and equality-centric, the 
market- and autonomy-centric, and the future- and multipurpose-centric ideals, 
over three broad periods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 The observations for the proportion of Keynesian indicators fall outside the standard deviation range in 
election manifestos from 1948, 1952, 1958, 1970, 1973, 1976 and 1994.  
13 The observations for the proportion of Neoliberal indicators fall outside the standard deviation range in 
election manifestos from 1948, 1952, 1958, 1960, 1973, 1976 and 1994.  
14 The observations for the proportion of Social Investment indicators fall outside the standard deviation range in 
election manifestos from 1958, 1964, 1973, 2002 and 2010.  
15 In table 7, the mean values for the first wave together add up to 101%. This figure is against the logic of 
equation 3. The aggregated proportion for all ideal types should be precisely 100%. However, the abnormal 
number of 101% is a consequence of impreciseness in the presentation. Here, all figures have been rounded up – 
hence the joint overstep. More precise figures for the proportions are: Keynesianism 62,7 %, Neoliberalism 8,7% 
and Social Investment 28,5%.(SAP election manifestos 1948-2014). However, this imperfection is merely a 
cosmetic issue and has therefore been neglected in the continued presentation.   
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Table 7 – Mean value for the ideal type’s proportion over the waves of welfare state developments 
 (Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014) 
 
 
 
Table 7 shows that the mean for the Keynesian stance was highest during the 
Second Wave, with a mean value of 73%. The Neoliberal and the Social 
Investment stances, on the other hand, both reached their highest mean value 
during the Third Wave of welfare state developments, with a mean value of 10% 
and 34% respectively. In accordance with figure 6, table 7 also shows that the 
mean values for the Keynesian stance are higher than mean values for the other 
two during all three waves.  
6.2 Intra ideal type developments  
The passage below presents the results for the, hitherto, more unexplored area of 
internal developments of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare 
ideals. Table 8, 9 and 10 show the relative importance of each ideal type (first 
level) subgroup16. (The tables are constructed using equation). The figures in table 
8, 9 and 10 tell how SAP balanced the internal elements of each welfare ideal, at 
each point in time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16 In table 8, 9 and 10, alone or shared domination is indicated with bold black outer lining.  
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Table 8 – Internal developments Keynesianism 
 (Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 illustrates that, among Keynesian indicators, subgroup A1 (The state 
should protect the citizens) is the most prominent during the entire time period 
studied. Subgroup A2 (The state should act as an economic stabilizer) is the least 
prominent, and always lies just below or at the same level as subgroup A3 (The 
state should reduce the citizens' (financial) dependence on the labor market).  
Table 9 and 10 tell that the results for Neoliberal and Social Investment 
indicator subgroups are considerably less consistent. 
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Table 9 – Internal developments Neoliberalism 
(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 shows that the subgroup B1 (The welfare sector is a burden) dominates 
alone17 four years (1952, 1956, 1988, and 1994). Subgroup B2 (The market sector 
is the solution), on the other hand, dominates alone three times (in the years 1979, 
1982 and 1985). Subgroup B3 (The citizens should be independent and in control) 
dominates alone only twice (in the years 1968 and 1991) – the fewest times – and 
subgroup B4 (The labor market should be deregulated) dominates alone the most 
– five – times (in the years 1964, 1970, 1998, 2002 and 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
17 Dominates alone means that there is no overlap in majority among subgroups in the ideal type. For example, if 
category B1 and B2 have the same proportion of indicators in an election manifesto, that year is not accounted 
for as a year when a subgroup dominated alone.   
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Table 10 – Internal developments Social Investment 
(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014) 
 
 
 
Table 10 shows that, for Social Investment, the subgroup C2 (Social services aim 
to prevent citizens from needing state support) dominates in general but not all the 
time. The subgroup dominates alone eleven times (in the years 1948, 1952, 1958, 
1964, 1973, 1976, 1982, 1994, 1998, 2006, and 2010). Further, subgroup C1 (The 
state should support citizens when the market fails to do so) dominates alone six 
times (in the years 1956, 1960, 1968, 1979, 1988 and 1991) whereas subgroup C3 
(Education/human capital is central for wellbeing) dominates alone only four 
times (in year 1970, 1985, 2002 and 2014). Additionally, the allotment of Social 
Investment indicators differs from the one for Neoliberalism as the subgroups for 
Social Investment do not overlap in domination. Keynesian subgroups alike, the 
Social Investment code scheme indicators subgroups always dominate alone (i.e. 
there are no overlaps in majority proportion). However, unlike the uncontested 
Keynesian subgroup A1, the (alone) domination of Social Investment code 
scheme subgroups varies over time. 
An alternative way to examine the intra ideal type developments is to look at 
the mean values for the total proportion of indicators of each (first level) 
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subgroup. Table 11 presents such means. (Table 11 is constructed using equation 
518). Here, the mean values give an idea of which aspects of Keynesianism, 
Neoliberalism and Social Investment were most discussed, throughout the entire 
time period.  
 
Table 11 – Mean values for first level code scheme indicator subgroups 
 (Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 shows that, for Keynesianism, the mean value for subgroup A1 (83%) is 
considerably higher than the mean value for subgroup A3 (14%). The mean value 
for A3 is in turn much higher than the value for subgroup A2 (3%). For 
Neoliberalism, the mean values are more equal, starting with B1 (23%) as the 
highest value, and then falling in order B4 (22%), B2 (20%) and B3 (16%). For 
the Social Investment code scheme indicator subgroups, there is less deviation 
between the mean values than for the Keynesian ones, yet the mean values are 
slightly more spread out than the ones for Neoliberalism. Here, subgroup C2 
(45%) has the highest mean value, followed by subgroup C1 (31%). Subgroup C3 
then has the lowest mean value (of 24%).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
18 In table 11, the percentages for the subgroups of the Neoliberal ideal (B1, B2, B3 and B4) do not add up to 
100%. This might appear odd, but the figures are in line with equation 5. Accordingly, the aggregated proportion 
of Neoliberal indicators has been divided by 21 (the number of analyzed election manifestos). However, in four 
of the election manifestos (from 1958, 1960, 1973 and 1976) no Neoliberal indicators were found. In order for 
the percentages of the Neoliberal subgroups to add up to 100%, the aggregated proportion of these indicators 
should instead have been divided by 17 (21-4). This would yield the following distribution: B1 28%, B2 25%, 
B3 20% and B4 27% (SAP election manifestos 1948-2014). As shown, the internal hierarchy of Neoliberal 
subgroups is not affected by the size of the denominator. Table 11 therefore presents the precise figures 
generated by equation 5.  
  53 
7 Discussion and conclusion 
Finally, it is time to discuss how this thesis answers the research question of how 
developments in SAP’s welfare ideology over the past 70 years can be 
understood, using the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social 
Investment welfare ideals?  
The following presentation first reviews this thesis’s main findings. 
Thereafter, it discusses the results at length, starting with this thesis’s findings on 
inter ideal type developments. Importantly, this involves comparing the results to 
the three waves of welfare state developments. Subsequently, the section 
considers this thesis’s findings on intra ideal type developments. Finally, the 
section provides a summarizing comment (at a higher level of abstraction) and 
presents this thesis main conclusions. Altogether, the passage addresses the 
research problem postulated in the introduction of this thesis. 
7.1 Main findings 
In sum, subsequent discussion involves three main findings which both support 
and contradict the preexisting literature. First, the results indicate that the 
developments in SAP welfare ideology have involved considerable short-term 
fluctuations. From one election to another, the relative emphasis between 
Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals has been proven 
highly flexible. The degree of ideological flexibility appears to have been (yet 
with a slight tendency to decline over time) constant since the end of the Second 
World War. Further, the results presented herein indicate that SAP’s welfare 
ideological developments do not concur with the stylized temporal changes as 
three waves of welfare state developments.  
Second, the rank order between Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment 
ideals has been constant in the long-run. Since the end of the Second World War, 
the Keynesian welfare ideals have always been the most prominent. The Social 
Investment ideals have always had a position in the middle, and the Neoliberal 
ideals have always been the least prominent. Moreover, the Neoliberal element of 
SAP welfare advocacy has been the most consistent since the Second World War. 
In contrast, the Keynesian element – albeit always most prominent among the 
three – has had the highest difference between its ups and downs in relative 
ideological emphasis. Relatedly, the overriding welfare ideology of SAP does not 
seem to have been watered-down over the past 70 years. Instead, SAP shows the 
same ideological density (considering the three conceptual lenses all together) 
throughout the entire time period.   
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Third, the character of SAP developments, among the conceptual lenses 
internally, is discordant. Time does not seem to have effected SAP’s emphasis 
within Keynesianism at all. Thus, developments in SAP welfare also involve a 
considerable element of stability, in regards of the core view on the use of the 
welfare system. However, the internal stability of Keynesianism does not translate 
neither to the Neoliberal nor the Social Investment ideals. These are instead tinged 
by vast internal fluctuations, which appear to be inconsistent over time.  
 
7.2 Discussion on inter ideal type developments 
7.2.1 Ideological (in)stability, and the three waves of welfare state 
developments 
A core advantage of this analysis is the over time perspective, which enables of 
both a short- and long-term analysis. This is of great use when examining 
ideological stability and/or flexibility19.  
Starting with the short run implications, figure 6 and table 5 indicate that SAP 
continuously – and rapidly (from election to election) – change their ideological 
emphasis. Both the Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment indicators 
demonstrate remarkable swings. Looking, for instance, at Neoliberalism between 
1976 and 1979, the proportion jumps from zero to 16 percent. Social Investment 
shows and eye-catching example from 1958 to 1960, where the proportion rises 
with 31 percentage points. This indicates momentary ideological flexibility, in 
line with Moschonas’s claims. Moschonas suggestions gain further support from 
the fact that 19 out of 63 observations fall outside the standard deviation (table 6). 
However, the results do not seem to indicate increased flexibility over time. If 
anything, rather the opposite. From 1994, the differences in ideal type proportions 
between elections seem somewhat smaller (figure 6). Thus, Moschonas’s idea of 
none-linear developments gains support from this thesis, but his suggestions on 
flexibility increasing over time do not seem to hold for SAP’s welfare ideology.   
Focusing, instead, in the long run implications, it is relevant to relate the 
results to Hinnfors’s suggestions. First, it is interesting that the ideal type 
proportions never intersect. The proportion of Keynesian indicators is always 
highest, the Social Investment proportion is in the middle, and the Neoliberal is at 
the bottom (figure 6). This internal hierarchy indicates that Hinnfors is right in 
regards of long-term SAP ideological stability. Breaking down the analysis to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
19 The word flexibility is herein used in a non-normative way. This thesis uses the word only since it corresponds 
to Moschonas’s vocabulary. For the sake of this thesis, the word could be considered as merely representing 
instability.  
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focusing on Hinnfors’s suggestions on SAP’s relation to the market – via 
Neoliberal indicators – this thesis’s results seem to provide even more support. 
The standard deviation of Neoliberal indicators is lowest of all ideal types (table 
6). Accordingly, the mean values of the Neoliberal proportion vary the least over 
the three waves of welfare state developments. Together, this means that 
Neoliberal element of SAP welfare advocacy has been the most consistent since 
the Second World War. Again, this could be interpreted as proof for Hinnfors’s 
claim that SAP has pursued a stable attitude towards the market’s involvement in 
the welfare system.  
Overall, Hemerijck’s idea of three waves of specific welfare state 
developments gain little support from this thesis’s results on SAP ideology. 
Focusing on the peaks of indicator proportions (figure 6 and table 5), only the 
Keynesian ideal type reaches its highest value in the anticipated period. As 
predicted, the Keynesian indicators peak during the first wave, but neither the 
Neoliberal nor the Social Investment indicators reach their highest values when 
they were expected to do so. Instead, the proportion of Neoliberal indicators peaks 
in the third wave, and the one for Social Investment – like the proportion of 
Keynesian indicators – peaks during the first wave.  
Focusing, instead, on the mean values of ideological proportions (table 7), 
only the Social Investment ideal type accounts for its highest value during the 
expected period. As anticipated, the mean value of the Social Investment 
proportion is highest during the third wave. Contrastingly, the mean value of the 
Keynesian proportion is highest during the second wave, and the Neoliberal 
proportion – like the one for Social Investment – has its highest mean value 
during the third wave.  
In sum, the findings on SAP’s welfare ideological developments do not concur 
with Hemerijck’s suggestions. Neither do they, however, show any other obvious 
trend in temporal developments, which could replace Hemerijck’s propositions.  
7.2.2 Ideological dissolution and the neoliberal inclination 
Section 5.4.3 regards figure 4 and 5 as indicators of that this thesis achieves high 
reliability. Nevertheless, the figures could be interpreted in another way too. As 
figure 4 and 5 show, the correspondence between number of words and number of 
identified indicators is remarkable constant over time. This indicates that SAP has 
had the same ideological density over the entire time period examined. 
Accordingly, the results presented herein oppose Tingsten’s ide of inevitable 
ideological dissolution. Instead, the overall ideological emphasis, seems 
persistent.  
Neither considering the peaks and valleys (figure 6 and table 5), nor the mean 
values (table 7) of ideological proportions, does SAP appear to have given up 
Keynesian ideals in favor of Neoliberal ones. Instead, SAP’s Neoliberal emphasis 
seems to have been most stable (and the least prominent), compared to both 
Keynesianism and Social Investment. Thus – focusing on welfare ideology 
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specifically – this thesis shows no proof of Lavelle’s idea of Neoliberal ideals 
taking down social democracy.  
Interestingly though, 1948 to 1976/1979 Keynesianism and Social Investment 
appear to have an inverse relation. Accordingly, these welfare ideals seem to 
compete over space in SAP's welfare ideology. However, in 1976/1979 there is a 
change. Since 1976/1979, the Social Investment emphasis seems to be steadily 
rising (albeit not yet reaching the top score of 1964). The initial inverse 
relationship between Keynesianism and Social Investment has thus become less 
obvious since the 1976/1979 election. Perhaps this reflects Giddens’s suggestion 
of social democratic parties – since the Second World War – trying to cope with 
capitalism and find Social Investment as a third way; between Keynesianism and 
Neoliberalism.  
Since 1976/1979, Keynesianism seems to instead be competing with 
Neoliberalism. The Keynesian and Neoliberal proportions are less close (in 
numbers) than the Keynesian and Social Investment proportions are. Yet, figure 6 
shows that, since 1976/1979, the Keynesian emphasis rises when the Neoliberal 
declines and vice versa. In sum, the later years indicate a competition over space 
in SAP's welfare ideology between Keynesianism and Neoliberalism, combined 
with a steady rise of the party's advocacy of Social Investment welfare ideals. 
7.2.3 Contextualizing the inter ideal type developments 
As stated previously, this thesis does not aim to explain causes of change in 
SAP’s welfare ideology. Yet, following passage touches upon such explanations. 
The section is, however, highly relevant to this thesis and serves to contextualize 
the presented results. Therefore, the section first considers SAP’s cooperation 
with other political parties. Second, it reflects on SAP’s position in parliament 
(i.e. in government or opposition). Third, the section discusses the findings on 
SAP developments and contemporary economic circumstances.  
Since the end of the Second World War, SAP has taken part in two coalition 
governments (Appendix 9.1). The first one lasted from 1951 to 1957. Then SAP 
cooperated with The Center Party. The second coalition government was formed 
by SAP and The Green Party in 2014, and is still in place at the time of writing 
(Nationalencyklopedin b). This means that SAP has formulated three election 
manifestos based on political cooperation with another party; in the years 1952, 
1956 and 2014. In principle, this political cooperation could have affected the 
characteristics of the welfare ideology communicated by SAP. However, the 
election manifestos from the years 1952, 1956 and 2014 do not seem to deviate 
from the others in any noteworthy manner. Instead, the manifesto from the years 
1956 and 2014, both fall within the range of the standard deviation. In the year 
1952, the Keynesian and Neoliberal distribution falls just outside (table 6).  
The reasoning above suggests that SAP’s welfare ideal advocacy is not 
considerably affected by neither political cooperation itself, nor whom the party 
cooperates with.  
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During the time period examined, SAP has formulated its election manifesto 
five times when in opposition (i.e. when the party did not hold office); in the years 
1979, 1982, 1994, 2010 and 2014 (Appendix 9.1) (Nationalencyklopedin b). 
Three of these – the years 1979, 1982 and 2014 – fall within the range of the 
standard deviation (table 6). In 1994, however, the proportion of Neoliberal 
indicators reaches its highest level whereas the proportion of Keynesian indicators 
almost reaches its bottom (table 5). In 2010, on the other hand, both the 
Keynesian and Neoliberal distribution fall within the range of the standard 
deviation, but the proportion of Social Investment indicators reaches one of its 
highest values (table 5 and 6). Accordingly, neither being in opposition seems to 
affect SAP’s welfare ideal advocacy in any distinct way.  
In sum, the passage above indicates that SAP is not prone to change its 
welfare ideology due to pressure from other political parties. This could have (at 
least) two possible interpretations. First, it could indicate that pressure from other 
political parties is irrelevant for SAP’s welfare ideological development. This 
would explain why none of the aforementioned scholars have highlighted this 
aspect as a reason to ideological change. Second and alternatively, it could 
suggest there is already a wide-ranging consensus among Swedish parties on how 
to operate the welfare system. If so, SAP would not need to adjust its view 
depending on the party’s temporary power position. This second interpretation 
harmonizes with Giddens’s and Lavelle’s ide of a general dissolution of strict 
right- and left-wing politics. However, the suggestion of SAP as insensible to 
pressure from other parties, is poorly substantiated by this thesis. To make solid 
claims about this issue, a deeper analysis (of for example implementation or 
policy suggestions) is necessary.  
If the previous research presented herein does not highlight pressure from 
other political parties as a prime causal effect to ideological developments, then 
what does it emphasize? As presented in the section on previous research, the 
resounding answer is SAP external economic circumstances. Therefore, the 
following section pays attention to SAP’s welfare ideology in connection to 
Sweden’s annual GDP-growth since the Second World War (due to the lack of 
uniform information, the year of 1948 has been left out). However, this passage 
should be read with some discretion. The section only considers GDP-growth the 
very same years as SAP published their manifestos. Nevertheless, SAP is likely 
more affected by the general economic growth over a number of years. Therefore, 
the following reasoning might be slightly deficient.  
Overall, there seems to be no evident trait in how SAP’s welfare ideology 
responds to economic trends – neither to expansion nor to recession. The 
Keynesian as well as the Neoliberal indicators reach their highest proportions in 
times of both economic expansion (defined as annual GDP-growth ≥ 4%) and 
economic recession (defined as annual GDP-growth ≤ 2%). For example, in both 
the years of 1973 and 1976, the proportion of Keynesian indicators reached top 
scores (table 5). However, the Swedish GDP-growth differed substantially 
between these years. In 1973 GDP grew by 4%, whereas the year of 1976 only 
involved 1,2% growth (Appendix 9.2) (SCB). Similarly, the proportion of 
Neoliberal indicators was especially high in the years of 1952 and 1994 (figure 6). 
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These years’ manifestos correspond to a GDP-growth of only 1,5% in 1952 and – 
as much as – 4,1% in 1994 (Appendix 9.2) (SCB).  
The results for Social Investment are slightly different. For his proportion, 
both the peaks and valleys occur during times of GDP-growth above 2%. For 
example, the proportion of Social Investment indicators peaks in 1964 when the 
annual GDP-growth reaches 6,8%. When the Social Investment proportion instead 
is at its lowest point, in 1958, the growth rate is still 2,8% (table 5 and Appendix 
9.2) (SCB).  
In sum, this thesis’s results show no distinct trait in how SAP react to external 
economic circumstances – in regards of the advocated welfare ideal.  
7.3 Discussion on intra ideal type developments 
The contrast in internal developments of the different ideal types, is remarkable. 
Time does not seem to have effected SAP’s emphasis within Keynesianism at all 
(table 8). The most important aspect of Keynesianism is – throughout the entire 
time period – that the state should protect the citizens (subgroup A1). Again, this 
signals that Hinnfors is right. SAP remain stable in their fundamental view on 
welfare ideology – Keynesian indicators dominate in every election manifesto, 
and within Keynesianism subgroup A1 (The state should protect the citizens) is 
always most the prominent.  
In relation to Jenson’s aspects of welfare ideology components, this means 
that the views on rights and duties, and the responsibility mix is most important to 
SAP’s Keynesian emphasis. Interestingly, the aspect of access and governance 
seems to be the least important. This, as the subgroup A2 (The state should act as 
an economic stabilizer) is the least emphasized.  
Unfortunately, both the Neoliberal (table 9) and the Social Investment (table 
10) ideal types show considerably scattered results. These results, on the other 
hand, point towards SAP having a high level of flexibility in what is advocated – 
even within Neoliberalism and Social Investment ideal welfare. Yet again in 
accordance with Moschonas’s suggestions. Interestingly, though, they appear 
about equally scattered over time. Hence, SAP does not appear to have been 
neither more nor less inconsistent over time.  
This variation means that SAP, for Neoliberalism and Social Investment, 
incorporates all Jenson’s perspectives more or less evenly. This conclusion is 
further motivated since the subgroups (marginally) dominating in Neoliberalism 
B1 (The welfare sector is a burden), and Social Investment C2 (Social services 
aim to prevent citizens from needing state support), are both regarded as relating 
to all aspects of Jenson’s analysis (see section 4.5).   
When analyzing the mean values for first level subgroups, the Social 
Investment ideal type is of certain interest to this thesis (table 10). This, as the 
view that social services aim to prevent citizens from needing state support (C2) is 
the most salient idea. The prominence of this idea might signal just what Giddens 
and Moschans refer to when they suggest that social democracy is trying to find 
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its way, balancing the tasks of the market and the state. According to this thesis, 
the Social Investment welfare ideal implies substantial initial state responsibility. 
Later, however, the responsibility is transmitted to the individual, who must 
admire and maintain her capabilities in the (labor) market.   
7.4 Summarizing comment  
This thesis does not point towards any radical changes in the welfare ideology 
advocated by SAP. In contrast, SAP remains loyal to the prime advocacy of the 
Keynesian state- and equality-centric ideals. Neither does the analysis indicate 
that the spread of Neoliberal ideas – about the efficiency of the market and 
individual above collective responsibility – has infiltrated SAP to a noteworthy 
degree. The influence of Neoliberal market- and autonomy-centric ideals on SAP 
welfare ideology is stable and remains low over time. Consequently, this thesis 
does not consider SAP’s behavior – in regards of the advocated welfare ideal – as 
a prime cause of (neither past nor present) changes in the Swedish party system. 
Nevertheless, the welfare ideological emphasis seems slightly more mixed now 
than before. Since 1994, SAP advocates a more diverse welfare ideal which 
involves a steady rise of the Social Investment emphasis (starting in 1976/1979). 
This could be interpreted as SAP partly abandoning state-centric extremes in 
favor of an ideology somewhat closer to the middle of the political spectrum.  
So, in the long-run, SAP seems to have remained stable in their view of the 
very foundations of the welfare system, but what about the short run? This thesis 
points towards SAP being flexible, in their rhetoric about desired welfare system, 
already since the yearly days after the Second World War. From election to 
election, the party has adjusted their recommendations. SAP’s ideological 
stringency does, hence, not seem to have been eroded over time. Instead, short-
term flexibility thus appears to be an inherent part of SAP’s operandum (yet with 
a slight tendency to decline over time).  
This thesis has frequently returned to the issue of SAP’s especial relationship 
to a certain part of the electorate. Despite this thesis not being explicitly designed 
to examine this relationship, it yet offers some insights into SAP’s attitude 
towards the electorate. Notably, the importance of the state’s responsibility for its 
citizens’ wellbeing always trumps the importance of market efficiency and 
flexibility. The difference in emphasis of state- respectively market-centric ideals 
might have become reduced over time, yet it remains significant. Moreover, 
SAP’s main focus, among these state-centric ideals, is of great relevance here. 
Since the end of the Second World War until today, SAP continues to advocate 
the state as the ultimate protector of the population. This thesis thus concludes that 
– in regards of the advocated welfare ideal – SAP’s attitude towards the electorate 
has not undergone any essential transformation. Instead, SAP’s welfare ideology 
remains loyal to the state-centric ideals, and the state-centric ideals remain loyal 
to the initially postulated prime obligation of the state; to protect the citizens. 
  60 
Again, this means that Jenson’s ideas of rights and duties, and the responsibility 
mix in welfare ideals, are the overarching aspects of SAP’s welfare ideology.  
Interestingly, this thesis shows that – parallel to the maintenance of the state-
centric ideals – SAP has incorporated both market- and autonomy-centered ideals, 
as well as future- and multipurpose-centric ideals. The importance of 
multipurpose-centric ideals – already in the early aftermath of the Second World 
War – shows that such an intermediate approach (between complete resignation to 
either the state or the market), has constituted an important pillar of SAP’s 
program for a long time. In opposite to the claim that social democratic parties 
have formulated this kind of middle way to cope with recent developments of 
European party systems, this thesis thus suggest that this was included in Swedish 
social democracy even long before the golden era.  
7.5 Concluding remark 
In conclusion, the understanding of developments in SAP welfare ideology, over 
the past 70 years, involve the following key insights: The Keynesian state- and 
equality-centric ideal has, and continues to be, most important to SAP. From 1948 
to 1976/1979, this ideal seems to compete against the Social Investment future- 
and multipurpose-centric ideal, in regards of space in SAP's welfare ideology. 
However, in 1976/1979 there is a change in the structure; since 1976/1979, the 
Social Investment emphasis seems to be steadily rising. Since 1976/1979, 
Keynesianism seems to, instead, be competing with the Neoliberal market- and 
autonomy-centric ideal. In sum, the later years indicate a competition over space 
in SAP's welfare ideology between Keynesianism and Neoliberalism, combined 
with a steady rise of the party's advocacy of Social Investment welfare ideals. 
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8 Suggestions for further research  
This section suggests two main approaches further research could take on to shed 
more light on the research problem addressed herein. First, the field would benefit 
from a comprehensive examination of the general traits in SAP’s policy 
suggestion and implementations. This thesis has previously suggested that the 
literature on SAP policies already is extensive. That is true. Yet, these studies tend 
to focus narrowly on the characters of only one or a few suggestions or 
implementation. An analysis broader in content and temporal scope would assist 
the discussion on how SAP has coped with changes of the (party-) political 
system. Moreover, an analysis focusing explicitly on implementations might 
contribute with a picture closer to reality, than this thesis. Since this thesis focuses 
on what SAP communicate about themselves, there is likely a discrepancy 
between what is observed in this study and what is experienced by the population 
(in terms of actual policy implementation).  
Second, to fully understand SAP’s (welfare) ideological developments it 
would be fruitful to carry out an analysis more deeply focused on the theoretical 
implications of different welfare ideals. An in-depth analysis of the precise 
implications of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment ideals would help 
revealing what it actually means for SAP to, for example, increasingly incorporate 
Social Investment ideals in the desired welfare system. Such study would 
preferably outline the fine nuances of different welfare ideals, and thus enable an 
analysis which covers – what this thesis might have experienced as – conceptual 
blind spots.  
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Swedish governments from 1945 
Table 12 shows the English and Swedish names of the political parties relevant 
for this thesis, and how these names are abbreviated. Then, table 13 shows which 
party or parties, that have held office during the examined time period, and whom 
has been prime minister.  
 
Table 12 – Abbreviations of party names 
 (Source: The Swedish Parliament a; The Swedish Parliament b) 
 
Abbreviation English name Swedish name 
C The Center Party Centerpartiet 
KD The Christian Democrats Kristdemokraterna 
L The Liberal Party Liberalerna  
MP The Green Party Miljöpartiet 
M The Moderate Party Moderaterna 
SAP The Social Democratic Party Socialdemokraterna 
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Table 13 – Swedish governments from 1945 
 (Source: Nationalencyklopedin b) 
 
Time period Prime Minister Party/parties in government 
1945-1946 Per Albin Hansson (SAP) SAP 
1946-1951 Tage Erlander (SAP) SAP 
1951-1957 Tage Erlander (SAP) Coalition between SAP and C 
1957-1969 Tage Erlander (SAP) SAP 
1969-1976 Olof Palme (SAP) SAP 
1976-1978 Thorbjörn Fälldin (C) Coalition between C, L and M 
1978-1979 Ola Ullsten (L) L 
1979-1981 Thorbjörn Fälldin (C) Coalition between C, L and M 
1981-1982 Thorbjörn Fälldin (C) Coalition between C and L 
1982-1986 Olof Palme (SAP) SAP 
1986-1991 Ingvar Carlsson (SAP) SAP 
1991-1994 Carl Bildt (M) Coalition between M, C, L and KD 
1994-1996 Ingvar Carlsson (SAP) SAP 
1996-2006 Göran Persson (SAP) SAP 
2006-2014 Fredrik Reinfeldt (M) Coalition between M, C, L and KD 
2014- Stefan Löfven (SAP) Coalition between SAP and MP 
 
 
Table 13 shows that SAP has accounted for head of government in ten (see shaded 
cells) of the 16 government constellations which have taken place since the 
Second World War. Two times during this time period has SAP taken part of 
coalition governments. In the years 1951 to 1957, a coalition government 
including SAP and the Center Party held office. Since 2014 (and at the time of 
writing) SAP and the Green Party are the incumbents.  
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9.2 Sweden’s GDP-Growth 1950 – 2014 
Figure 7 and table 14 present Sweden’s annual GDP-growth, during the examined 
time period. Due to the lack of uniform information, the year of 1948 has been left 
out. Instead, the growth of 1950 serves as the benchmark for the other years. 
Hence, the growth of the year 1950 takes on the value zero.  
 
 
Figure 7 – Sweden’s GDP-Growth 1950 – 2014 
(Source: SCB) 
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Table 14 – Sweden’s GDP-Growth 1950 – 2014 
(Source: SCB) 
 
Year GDP-
Growth 
1950 0% 
1952 1,5% 
1956 3,3% 
1958 2,4% 
1960 3,5% 
1964 6,8% 
1968 3,6% 
1970 6,9% 
1973 4% 
1976 1,2% 
1979 3,8% 
1982 1,4% 
1985 2,3% 
1988 2,5% 
1991 -1% 
1994 4,1% 
1998 4,2% 
2002 2,1% 
2006 4,7% 
2010 6% 
2014 2,6% 
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9.3 Code schemes in English 
 
This appendix presents the code schemes for each ideal type respectively. In each 
code scheme, the right column provides references for the explicit indicator in the 
left column.  
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A. Core elements of Keynesianism References
A1. The state should protect the citizens (Jenson, 2010, p. 62; Jenson, 2012, p. 71)
A1.1 The state should ensure social justice/equity (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 442; Moschonas, 2002, p. 21, 63)
A1.2 Social services are universal rights (Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73)
A1.2.1 Social services should be consistent (Newman et al., 2014, p. 370)
A1.2.2 Social services should be standardized (Newman et al., 2014, p. 370)
A1.2.3 Social services should be distributed equally/equally available among the citizens (Moschonas, 2002, p. 63)
A1.2.4 The state should be accountable for social services (Newman et al., 2014, p. 370)
A1.3 Social services aim to enhance equality (Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73)
A1.3.1 Equality means having the same living conditions (Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73)
A1.3.2 Wealth should be fairly/eavenly distributed (Moschonas, 2002, p. 21, 63)
A1.3.3 Income transfers enhance equality (Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73)
A1.4 Social services aim to protect/secure the population (Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73)
A1.4.1 Citizens should be guaranteed social services (Jenson, 2010, p. 60)
A1.4.2 Social services function as insurance against misfortune (Jenson, 2010, p. 63)
A1.4.3 Social services are provided to passive citizens (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 51)
A1.5 Social services are compensatory/provided retroactively (De Deken, 2014, p. 260; Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 73)
A1.5.1 Social services should be generous and easily accessible (De Deken, 2014, p. 266)
A1.5.2 Benefits should be provided on a long-term basis (De Deken, 2014, p. 266)
A1.6 Social services should focus on especially important issues/risks (Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73)
A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services (Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73)
A1.6.2 Poor health is especially important for social services (Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429)
A1.6.3 Old age is especially important for social services (Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73)
A1.6.4 Disabilities are especially important for social services (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429)
A1.7 Social services are improved through higher spending/input (Jenson, 2012, p. 75)
A2. The state should act as an economic stabilizer (Offe, 2014, p. 60)
A2.1 The state should govern through an extensive bureaucratic apparatus (Jenson, 2010, p. 69; Jenson, 2012, p. 75)
A2.1.1 The state should have wide-ranging authorities (Jenson, 2012, p. 75)
A2.1.2 The state should have wide-ranging responsibilities (Jenson, 2012, p. 75)
A2.1.3 The state should be active/influential (Moschonas, 2002, p. 63)
A2.1.4 The welfare system should be organized around state institutions (Moschonas, 2002, p. 63)
A2.1.5 The state should take on a national perspective (Moschonas, 2002, p. 63, 262)
A2.2 The state should balance economy cycles/act countercyclically (Crouch & Keune, 2014, p. 332-333; Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 73)
A2.3 The economy is managed through consumption/demand-oriented means (Moschonas, 2002, p. 63, 262)
A2.3.1 Aggregate demand should be expanded (Aspromourgos, 2012, p. 150)
A2.3.2 Evening out wealth increases the citizens' consumption power (Moschonas, 2002, p. 63, 262)
A2.3.3 Evening out wealth involves supporting wage-earners (Aspromourgos, 2012, p. 150)
A2.4 Consumption of social services takes place in the present (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 440)
A3. The state should reduce the citizens' (financial) dependence on the labor market (Moschonas, 2002, p. 66)
A3.1 The state should reduce labor market insecurity (Moschonas, 2002, p. 66)
A3.2 The state should ensure full (male) employment (Jenson, 2012, p. 73)
A3.2.1 Male industrial workers constitute the labor force (Jenson, 2012, p. 73; Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 255)
A3.2.2 The state should protect the (male) workers (Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 255)
A3.3 Issue-organizations/associations are desirable (Jenson, 2012, p. 77)
A3.3.1 Strong labor unions/specific economic issue-organizations are desirable (Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 255)
A3.4 Citizens should complete mandatory education (Jenson, 2012, p. 72)
Table 15 – Keynesian indicators 
 (References in the right column) 
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9.4 Code schemes in Swedish 
This appendix presents the code schemes translated into Swedish. Herein, the 
references have been left out. However, the references for each indicator in 
Swedish are the same as for the corresponding indicator in English (for example, 
the reference to C1.1 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja gamla sociala 
risker/frågor, is the same as to C1.1 The market should handle old social 
risks/issues. Thus, the interested reader can consult the code schemes in English to 
find the explicit references.   
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A. Kärnfaktorer för Keynesianism
A1. Staten bör skydda medborgarna
A1.1 Staten bör försäkra social rättvisa
A1.2 Välfärdstjänster är universella rättigheter 
A1.2.1 Välfärdstjänster bör vara konsekventa/likvärdiga
A1.2.2 Välfärdstjänster bör vara standardiserade
A1.2.3 Välfärdstjänster bör fördelas jämnt över/vara lika tillgängliga för alla medborgare
A1.2.4 Staten bör vara ansvarsskyldig för välfärdstjänster
A1.3 Välfärdstjänster syftar till att öka jämställdheten/jämlikheten
A1.3.1 Jämställdhet/jämlikhet innebär att ha samma förutsättningar i livet
A1.3.2 Förmögenhet bör fördelas rättvist/jämnt
A1.3.3 Inkomstöverföringar ökar jämställdheten/jämlikheten
A1.4 Välfärdstjänster syftar till att skydda/trygga befolkningen 
A1.4.1 Medborgarna bör garanteras välfärdstjänster
A1.4.2 Välfärdstjänster fungerar som en försäkring för olyckor/motgångar
A1.4.3 Välfärdstjänster tillhandahålls passiva medborgare
A1.5 Välfärdstjänster är kompenserande/tillhandahålls retroaktivt
A1.5.1 Välfärdstjänster bör vara generösa och lättillgängliga
A1.5.2 Bidrag bör tillhandahållas under lång tid
A1.6 Välfärdstjänster ska fokusera på speciellt viktiga frågor/risker
A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster
A1.6.2 Dålig hälsa är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster
A1.6.3 Hög ålder är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster
A1.6.4 Funktionshinder är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster
A1.7 Välfärdstjänster förbättras genom högre utgifter/insats av resurser
A2. Staten ska stabilisera ekonomin
A2.1 Staten ska styra genom ett omfattande byråkratiskt system
A2.1.1 Staten bör ha omfattande befogenheter
A2.1.2 Staten bör ha ett omfattande ansvar
A2.1.3 Staten bör vara aktiv/inflytelserik
A2.1.4 Välfärdssystemet bör vara organiserat kring statliga institutioner
A2.1.5 Staten bör anta ett nationellt perspektiv
A2.2 Staten ska jämna ut konjunktursvängningar
A2.3 Ekonomin hanteras genom konsumtions-/efterfrågerelaterade åtgärder
A2.3.1 Total efterfrågan bör utökas
A2.3.2 Att jämna ut förmögenheter ökar medborgarnas köpkraft
A2.3.3 Att jämna ut förmögenheter innebär att stötta lönearbetare
A2.4 Konsumtion av välfärdstjänster sker i nuet
A3. Staten bör minska medborgarnas (ekonomiska) beroende av arbetsmarknaden
A3.1 Staten bör minska osäkerhet på arbetsmarknaden
A3.2 Staten bör försäkra full sysselsättning (för män)
A3.2.1 Arbetskraften utgörs av industriarbetande män
A3.2.2 Staten bör skydde (de manliga) arbetarna
A3.3 Sakfrågeorganisationer/förbund är önskvärda
A3.3.1 Starka fackföreningar är önskvärda
A3.4 Medborgarna bör fullgöra skolgångens obligatoriska del
Table 18 – Keynesian indicators in Swedish 
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B. Kärnfaktorer för Neoliberalism
B1. Välfärdssektorn är en börda
B1.1 Statens primära funktion bör vara att försäkra att medborgarna ej kränker varandras rättigheter
B1.2 Staten ska enbart stötta de fattigaste medborgarna
B1.3 Utgifter för välfärdstjänster bör vara begränsade
B1.4 Välfärdsutgifter hindrar ekonomisk tillväxt
B1.4.1 Välfärdsutgifter motverkar/avhåller initiativ till investeringar
B1.4.2 Välfärdsutgifter motverkar/avhåller initiativ till arbete
B1.4.3 Skatter bör vara låga
B1.5 Välfärdstjänster orsakar (oönskat) beroende av staten hos medborgarna
B1.5.1 Välfärdstjänster bör vara begränsade
B1.5.2 Behörigheten/rätten till välfärdstjänster bör vara begränsad
B1.5.3 Välfärdstjänster bör vara riktade
B1.5.4 Välfärdstjänster bör vara behovsprövade 
B1.5.5 Inkomstöverföringar bör vara begränsade
B1.5.6 Inkomstersättningar bör vara begränsade
B1.5.7 De som erhåller välfärdstjänster bör betala en del av tjänsten
B1.5.8 Välfärdstjänster bör enbart tillhandahållas aktiva medborgare
B1.6 Välfärdstjänster förbättras genom högre effektivitet/lägre kostnad per tjänst
B2. Marknadssektorn är lösningen
B2.1 Social jämställdhet/rättvisa är oförenligt med ekonomisk effektivitet
B2.1.1 Marknaden innebär/involverar ojämlikhet
B2.1.2 Ojämlikhet är nödvändigt för att motivera medborgarna till personlig utveckling 
B2.2 Välfärdstjänster bör privatiseras/tillhandahållas av marknaden
B2.2.1 Om privatisering ej är möjligt bör tjänster i offentlig regi drivas likt (privata) affärsrörelser
B2.2.2 Välfärdstjänster bör outsourcas/läggas på entreprenad
B2.2.3 Välfärdstjänster bör influeras av/drivas av ett flertal aktörer
B2.2.4 Välfärdstjänster bör vara decentraliserade
B2.2.5 Marknaden bör anta ett internationellt/globalt perspektiv
B2.3 Ekonomin hanteras genom utbudsrelaterade åtgärder
B2.3.1 Inflationen bör hållas låg
B2.3.2 Valutavärdet bör hållas stabilt
B2.3.3 Centralbanken bör vara fristående
B3. Medborgarna bör vara självständiga och kunna styra över sina egna liv
B3.1 Medborgarna bör vara självtillräckliga 
B3.1.1 Individen har det primära ansvaret för sitt eget och sin familjs välmående
B3.1.2 Medborgarna är experter (har unik kunskap om) sina livssituationer/förutsättningar
B3.1.3 Den som nyttjar en välfärdstjänst böra kunna styra/ha makt att välja tjänsteleverantör
B3.1.4 Privatisering av välfärdstjänster skänker nyttjaren möjligheten att välja tjänsteleverantör
B4. Arbetsmarknaden bör vara avreglerad
B4.1 Osäkerhet på arbetsmarknaden bör hanteras av individen själv
B4.2 Staten bör underlätta matchningen mellan parter på arbetsmarknaden 
B4.2.1 Arbetstagares rättigheter bör vara begränsade
B4.2.2 Arbetsgivares ansvar bör vara begränsat
B4.2.3 Minimilöner bör vara låga/möjliga att förhandla om
B4.3 Arbetslöshetsersättningen bör vara begränsad
B4.3.1 Att arbeta bör vara lönsamt (i jämförelse med att förlita sig på arbetslöshetsersättning)
B4.4 Alla som kan bör arbeta
A3.3 Sakfrågeorganisationer/förbund är icke önskvärda
B4.5.1 Medborgarna bör representera sig själva individuellt 
B4.6 Medborgarna uppmuntras att genomföra högre akademisk utbildning för att uppnå ekonomisk självständighet
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C. Kärnfaktorer för social investering
C1. Staten bör stötta medborgarna 
C1.1 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja gamla sociala risker/frågor
C1.1.1 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja arbetslöshet
C1.1.2 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja dålig hälsa
C1.1.3 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja hög ålder
C1.1.4 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja funktionshinder
C1.2 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja nya sociala risker/frågor
C1.2.1 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja arbetande fattiga (fattigdom trots förvärvsarbete)
C1.2.2 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja barnfattigdom
C1.2.3 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja kvinnors möjlighet till karriär
C1.2.4 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja ensamstående föräldrar
C1.2.5 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja möjligheten att kombinera arbets- och familjeliv
C1.2.6 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja invandring 
C1.2.7 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja långtidsarbetslöshet
C1.2.8 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja när färdigheter blir förlegade
C1.2.9 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja möjligheten att balansera arbete och fritid 
C2. Välfärdstjänster syftar till att förebygga medborgarnas behov av stöd från staten
C2.1 Social jämställdhet/rättvisa är förenligt med ekonomisk effektivitet
C2.1.1 Välfärdstjänster ökar individens produktivitet
C2.1.2 Att öka individers produktivitet gagnar samhället som helhet
C2.1.3 Bidrag bör tillhandahållas under kort tid
C2.1.4 Välfärdstjänster tillhandahålls aktiva medborgare
C2.2 Välfärdsstaten bör vara möjlighetsskapande
C2.2.1 Jämlikhet innebär att ha samma möjligheter
C2.2.2 Välfärdstjänster syftar till att bryta överföring (arv) av fattigdom mellan generationer 
C2.2.3 Välfärdsstaten bör försäkra social inkludering av alla 
C2.3 Välfärdsstaten bör vara framtidsorienterad
C2.3.1 Välfärdsutgifter anses som investeringar i framtiden
C2.3.2 Omsorg av barn och unga är viktigt eftersom de utgör morgondagens samhälle
C2.4 Välfärdsstaten bör uppmuntra medborgarna att anta ett livslångt perspektiv 
C2.4.1 Medborgare bör spara pengar så att de kan sörja för sig själva vid händelse av framtida olycka/motgång
C2.4.2 Det bör vara lönsamt för medborgare att överföra/fördela pengar över olika livsfaser (i jämförelse med att konsumera allt i den nuvarande)
C2.5 Välfärdssektorn bör bestå av partnerskap/samverkan och nätverk
C2.6 Välfärdstjänster förbättras genom högre produktionskapacitet/förbättrade resultat
C3. Utbildning/humankapital är centralt för välmående
C3.1 Medborgarna är skyldiga att investera i sitt humankapital
C3.1.1 Investeringar i humankapital börjar i förskolan
C3.1.2 Medborgarna bör genomföra högre akademisk utbildning
C3.1.3 Medborgarna bör genomföra yrkes/arbetsplatspraktik/träning/vidareutbildning
C3.1.4 Lärande kan även ske i informella miljöer 
C3.1.5 Färdigheter måste uppdateras kontinuerligt
C3.1.6 Medborgarna bör ha möjlighet till förbättring av sitt humankapital vid alla åldrar
C3.2 Förbättringar i humankapital skapar ekonomisk tillväxt
C3.2.1 Humankapital/utbildning är nära kopplat till anställning och skapar därigenom skatteintäkter
C3.3 Ekonomin hanteras genom utbudsrelaterade åtgärder
C3.3.1 Samhället bör skapa produktiva framtida skattebetalare
C3.4 Sakfrågeorganisationer/förbund är önskvärda
C3.4.1 Samfund för lokalt engagemang är önskvärda
Table 20 – Social Investment indicators in Swedish 
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9.5 Coding example election manifesto 2010 
The passages below present an extract from the SAP election manifesto published 
in 2010. The passages first present the first page if of the manifesto as it is 
originally written (the Swedish text is thus herein presented exactly as in the 
election manifesto). Then, the section presents an English translation of the 
manifesto (my translation). In both sections, footnotes mark when code scheme 
indicators have been identified, as well as the classification of the identified 
indicator.   
9.5.1 Coding example election manifesto 2010 – Swedish 
VÄGVALET  
VI VILL GÖRA SVERIGE TILL ETT MÖJLIGHETERNAS LAND 
 
Valet 2010 blir ett avgörande vägval: Vilket Sverige ska vi ha? Valet står mellan två helt 
olika drömmar, helt olika vägar för framtiden.  
 
När ekonomin växer blir det avgörande vägvalet; ska vi använda resurserna till fortsatta 
skattesänkningar för de mest välbeställda eller för fler jobb och bättre välfärd. Vi 
socialdemokrater vill att Sverige ska vara ett möjligheternas land för alla20, där var och en 
– oavsett bakgrund21 – får chansen22 att förverkliga sina drömmar. Jämlikhet frigör 
individen och får ekonomin och samhället att växa23. Det är ett välfärdsland där vi väljer 
att konkurrera med kunskap istället för låga löner. Där jobben blir fler, den sociala 
rörligheten är hög och alla får chansen24 att dra sitt strå till stacken. Där vi löser 
samhällsproblemen och investerar för framtiden tillsammans25. För det vinner alla på. Det 
är Socialdemokraternas väg.  
 
Den andra vägen har nu prövats i fyra år. Där gynnas de rikaste när skatterna sänkts med 
lånade pengar. Där växer klyftorna och lönerna pressas ner. Resultatet av den politiken är 
inte jobb. Vår gemensamma ekonomi krymper och personal sägs upp i skola och 
sjukvård. Företagen har svårt att anställa trots att arbetslösheten26 är skyhög, för 
utbildningsmöjligheterna är för få. Det försämrar konkurrenskraften och höjer räntorna på 
bostadslånen. Nu behövs en ny färdriktning. Den 19 september står svenska folket vid 
skiljevägen. Då ska vägvalet avgöras. Ska färden mot ett kallare Sverige fortsätta i fyra år 
till, och kommer det att vara värt priset?  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
20 C2.2.1 Jämlikhet innebär att ha samma möjligheter. 
21 C2.2.3 Välfärdsstaten bör försäkra social inkludering av alla.  
22 C2.2.1 Jämlikhet innebär att ha samma möjligheter.  
23 C2.1 Social jämställdhet/rättvisa är förenligt med ekonomisk effektivitet.  
24 C2.2.1 Jämlikhet innebär att ha samma möjligheter.  
25 C2.3.1 Välfärdsutgifter anses som investeringar i framtiden. 
26 A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster.  
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Socialdemokraterna väljer jobben27. Vi vill att Sverige ska vara ett möjligheternas land28.  
 
Det här är vår syn på vad som behöver göras på de fyra områden där vägvalet är som 
tydligast: 
 
1. FLER JOBB  
  
Vi vill att Sverige ska vara ett konkurrenskraftigt land i full sysselsättning29. Vi vill skapa 
villkor för exportindustrin, tjänstesektorn, småföretagen och välfärden att utvecklas starkt 
och anställa fler30. Vi ska ta vara på de stora möjligheter till utveckling och nya gröna 
jobb som finns i omställningen till en hållbar utveckling. Människors vilja till arbete är 
landets viktigaste tillgång31. En regering som slösar bort den resursen och låter 
arbetslösheten32 växa brister i ansvar för landet. Varje arbetad timme behövs. Med fler 
jobb så växer landets ekonomi. Vi ska tillbaka till överskott i de offentliga finanserna. Så 
tryggar33 vi en bättre välfärd och större möjligheter till ett rikare liv för dig – oavsett34 om 
du bor i en storstad eller i landsbygd. Regionalpolitiken ska utvecklas. Arbetslinjen 
betyder rätt till arbete, plikt35 att arbeta och möjligheter att rusta sig för nya jobb. Därför 
vill vi investera i 100 000 nya jobb36, praktik-37 och utbildningsplatser38 de närmaste åren.  
 
Socialdemokraterna väljer fler jobb39 istället för ökade klyftor:  
 
(SAP, 2010, p.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
27 A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster.  
28 C2.2 Välfärdsstaten bör vara möjlighetsskapande.  
29 A3.2 Staten bör försäkra full sysselsättning (för män).  
30 A1.7 Välfärdstjänster förbättras genom högre utgifter/insats av resurser.  
31 C3.2 Förbättringar i humankapital skapar ekonomisk tillväxt.  
32 A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster.  
33 A1.4 Välfärdstjänster syftar till att skydda/trygga befolkningen.  
34 A1.3.1 Jämställdhet/jämlikhet innebär att ha samma förutsättningar i livet.  
35 B4.4 Alla som kan bör arbeta. 
36 A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster.  
37 C3.1.3 Medborgarna bör genomföra yrkes/arbetsplatspraktik/träning/vidareutbildning.  
38 C3.1.2 Medborgarna bör genomföra högre akademisk utbildning.  
39 A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster.  
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9.5.2 Coding example election manifesto 2010 – English 
THE CHOICE OF PATH 
WE WANT TO MAKE SWEDEN A COUTRNY OF OPPORTUNITIES  
 
 
The election in 2010 will be a conclusive choice of path: What kind of Sweden do we 
want? The choice is between two completely different dreams, completely different paths 
for the future.  
 
When the economy is growing, the conclusive choice of path becomes; should we use the 
resources to reduce taxes for the people who are already the most well-off or to create 
more jobs and an improved welfare. We social democrats want Sweden to be a country of 
opportunities for everybody40, where each and every one – regardless of background41 – 
has the opportunity42 to make their dreams come true. Equality frees the individual and 
makes the economy and society grow43. It is a welfare state where we chose to compete 
with knowledge instead of low salaries. Where the job opportunities are more, the social 
mobility is high and everybody has the chance44 to pull one’s weight. Where we resolve 
social issues and invest in the future together45. Because it benefits us all. That is the path 
of the Social Democrats.  
 
The other path has now been tried out for four years. Where the richest people are favored 
when taxes are lowered using borrowed money. Where rifts are growing and salaries are 
pushed down. The result of such politics is not more jobs. Our shared economy is 
shrinking and staff members are dismissed within education and healthcare. The 
companies have difficulties hiring despite the sky-high unemployment46, as educational 
opportunities are too few. It weakens the competitiveness and raises the interest rates on 
housing loans. Now a new course is necessary. On the 19th of September the Swedish 
people face the crossroad. Then the choice of path will be determined. Shall the journey 
towards a colder Sweden precede for four more years, and will it be worth the price? 
 
The Social Democrats chose the jobs47. We want Sweden to be the country of 
opportunities48.  
 
This is our view of what needs to be done in the four areas where the choice of path is the 
most obvious: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
40 C2.2.1 Equality means having the same opportunities. 
41 C2.2.3 The welfare state should ensure social inclusion of all. 
42 C2.2.1 Equality means having the same opportunities. 
43 C2.1 Social equality/equity and economic efficiency are compatible. 
44 C2.2.1 Equality means having the same opportunities. 
45 C2.3.1 Social spending is regarded as investment in the future. 
46 A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services.  
47 A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services. 
48 C2.2 The welfare state should be enabling. 
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1. MORE JOBS 
 
We want Sweden to be a competitive country in full employment49. We want to create 
circumstances for the export industry, the service sector, the small companies and the 
welfare to develop strongly and hire more50. We will seize the big opportunities to 
development for development and new green jobs which exist in the transformation to a 
sustainable development. People’s will to work is the country’s most important asset51. A 
government which wastes this asset and allows the unemployment52 to grow is failing in 
taking responsibility for the country. Every hour of work is needed. With more jobs the 
country’s economy grows. We will reclaim the surplus in public finances. That is how we 
secure53 a better welfare and greater opportunities to a richer life for you – regardless54 of 
if you live in a city or in the country side. Regional politics shall be expanded. The 
workstream [translation of the political term Arbetslinjen] means the right to work, the 
duty55 to work and the possibilities to equip oneself for new jobs. We therefore want to 
invest in 100 000 new jobs56, internships57 and trainee positions58 in the coming years.  
 
The Social Democrats choses more jobs59 instead of an increased divide: 
 
(My translation, SAP, 2010, p. 1) 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
49 A3.2 The state should ensure full (male) employment. 
50 A1.7 Social services are improved through higher spending/input. 
51 C3.2 Human capital improvements create economic growth. 
52 A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services. 
53 A1.4 Social services aim to protect/secure the population. 
54 A1.3.1 Equality means having the same living conditions. 
55 B4.4 Everybody who is able to should work. 
56 A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services. 
57 C3.1.3 Citizens should complete occupational training. 
58 C3.1.2 Citizens should complete tertiary education. 
59 A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services. 
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